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INTRODUCTION 
With the recent high gasoline prices, an increasing number of motorists are looking more 
favorably towards public transit as a cheaper and viable mode of transportation.  Numerous 
municipalities across the U.S. have taken the long-term perspective in regards to creating 
viable alternative forms of transportation that would strategically support future regional 
growth in a sustainable way.  All facing population growth projections, cities such as 
Charlotte, Denver, and Houston have recently commenced large light rail expansion projects.  
Meanwhile, other cities with existing large rail networks such as San Francisco and Boston 
continue to invest and expand their public transportation backbones.   
There are a myriad of factors that will influence how well the transit systems perform (from 
both the user and operator’s perspective) and how much they will actually aid in the 
sustainable growth of their cities and regions.  Strategic zoning and land use plans will need 
to be conscientiously designed and considered on a variety of scales in order to direct the 
growth in appropriate areas.  A strong component of this planning effort will be the allowed 
densities and amenities required in the surrounding areas of the various transit stops.  Termed 
Transit-Oriented Development or TOD, the crux of the idea is that by encouraging an 
appropriate mixture of housing, retail and office space in the vicinity of the transit stops, 
vibrant and diverse communities will emerge.  The result will be a reduction of living 
expenses by the decreasing the need for the automobile, expanding access to jobs, and 
reducing the tendency of communities to sprawl out (assuming a regional growth plan is in 
place), all in addition to increasing ridership and therefore supporting the public investment 
of transit.   
Yet there are considerable challenges to creating vibrant TOD - from the acquisition of 
promising sites, to the common public aversion to increased density, to the ever-present issue 
of obtaining adequate financing.  Because TOD projects can often take several years longer 
to complete than traditional developments, the risks and challenges are often heightened.  
However, with the growing recognition that our current transportation systems and spatial 
growth arrangements are not sustainable (or at least not desired by all), public transportation 
and its accompanying TOD, are being seen more and more as essential tools towards a better 
future.  Many municipalities around the US have created specific corridor or neighborhood 
plans that concentrate development around stations; others have created specific funding 
sources to help catalyze their creation.  As the acquisition, hold and preparation of land is 
often the biggest hurdle towards creating more TOD, several municipalities have created 
specific financing tools or funds to help with this process.  Such TOD Land Acquisition 
Funds may not be the panacea to all financing problems, but they will certainly help address 
the critical pre-development and land acquisition funding gaps.  With many federal and state 
funding sources shrinking in recent years due to budget cuts, these gaps will only widen 
which means the need for targeted TOD financing sources will only increase.  
This paper will first review the benefits and challenges of creating more transit-oriented 
development before examining the common TOD funding sources (and importantly, 
identifying where the major funding gaps exist).  Next, we will focus on TOD Land 
Acquisition Funds which are an innovative way to provide financing for the acquisition, 
hold, and preparation of land in order to foster the creation of more TOD.  Since an 
understanding and examination of other national models and their lessons learned is vital, 
this paper will then explore a few of the common themes of three cities that have created land 
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acquisition funds -- San Francisco, Denver and Minneapolis – with the intent of better 
understanding how the Fund structure varies depending on the context specific needs and 
assets.  Finally, we will examine the case of Boston which is currently organizing a land 
acquisition fund and exploring the viability of a few different options of how the fund might 
be structured.  While Massachusetts has several pro-TOD programs and funding mechanisms 
already in place to facilitate developers focusing on TOD sites (see Appendix 9), critical pre-
development and acquisition still need to be addressed. Since the structure of the fund is still 
under consideration, it affords us the opportunity to examine their organizational process and 
examine the different potential outcomes. 
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OVERVIEW OF TOD 
WHAT IS TOD? 
Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) generally refers to higher density, mixed-use 
development within ½ mile radius (i.e. walking distance) of transit stations.  TOD focuses 
on the existing transit stations and infrastructure with a major goal of increasing the 
ridership, reducing automobile dependency and promoting vibrant, walkable communities 
with housing, jobs and shops all nearby.   
BENEFITS 
The benefits of TOD are numerous.  First, by focusing the development around transit 
stops, TOD: 
 Capitalizes on existing transit and infrastructure.   
 Reduces sprawl and preserves open space (assuming there is a regional growth plan 
in place). 
 Promotes more healthy lifestyles by increasing walking and biking, which may 
address the growing obesity epidemic facing America. 
 Reduces our overall cost of living by reducing Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT), which 
would in turn reduce the combined costs of housing and transportation.   
 A reduction in VMT would also improve environmental air quality by reducing the 
greenhouse gas emissions and 
 Eases traffic congestion. 
CHALLENGES 
With the benefits of growing more sustainably by locating more densely around existing 
transit stops, there also come many challenges, such as expensive and fragmented land, 
extending the length of development, high upfront costs, and standard underwriting criteria 
not being suitable for TOD.  This next section provides more detail about these challenges.   
Expensive and Fragmented Land 
Re-developable land near transit stations is usually limited and expensive.  For example, a 
2008 study by the Center for Transit-Oriented Development showed that of the 1.1 million 
urbanized acres of land in the San Francisco Bay Area, less than half of a percent of the 
land within ½ mile of a transit stop was both considered vacant or underutilized.1  In 
addition, the sites that are available are often small and/or in unorthodox parcel shapes.  
The city of Boston, which is quite built out, has had to frequently deal with this problem.  
While neighboring vacant parcels may be available, the presence of multiple land 
ownership can make the process of assembling enough land together to make the project 
viable, both financially and politically.  For example, while the city of Minneapolis 
                                                 
1 Mixed-Income TOD Acquisition Fund Business Plan Framework.  Center for Transit-Oriented Development, 
November 2008. Pg. 5. (Estimate does not include Resolution 3434 stations) 
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acquired several sites years ago specifically for future TOD, in today’s political and 
financial climate, they do not want to be perceived to be “in the land acquisition business”.  
This is due in large part to the checkered past of urban renewal efforts where many cities 
used eminent domain and residential displacement to “revitalize” neighborhoods in order to 
attract wealthier residents and promote economic development and greatly resulted in 
displacing lower-income residents.  While the public sector is often apprehensive to get too 
involved with the outright acquisition of land, the private sector - especially thru land 
speculation – is often very active soon after the station locations are announced.  They will 
purchase the sites (often primarily with private equity), drive up the prices and then sell for 
short-term gains.  The result is a land market where developers without significant equity 
sources (and especially affordable housing developers) are priced out.  Private banks are 
unfortunately not much help since this phase in the development process is perceived as 
extremely risky.   
A Long Time-Frame  
Transit stations can often take 15-20+ 
years from conception through 
construction.  Mixed-use TOD projects can 
often take 7-10 years to reach build-out as 
compared with 3-5 years for traditional 
single-use urban development.  This is 
often much longer than most lenders 
(particularly equity investors) are willing 
or able to wait for their return – especially 
in comparison to traditional construction 
types on a greenfield site.2  
The longer time frame also increases the 
carrying costs involved (i.e. loan interest, 
maintenance costs, real estate taxes, 
insurance, and electricity/heating/cooling 
costs, etc.).  As a result of the long time 
frame and the high up-front costs associated with TOD, it means that the majority of the 
returns will not be seen until the mid- to long-term.  Because traditional investment criteria 
such as internal rate of return and discounted cash flow value early projects returns more 
than long-term returns (meaning that 1st year’s Net Operating Income (NOI) has a greater 
impact on the Internal Rate of Return than the 10th year’s NOI), this could adversely affect 
the ability of TOD developers to secure equity funding.  In the end, the longer time frame 
increases the risk and IRR requirements from both the lenders and investors.  For the larger 
projects, which include several buildings, while project phasing is often used to mitigate 
the risks, the need for more patient capital (i.e. equity or debt financing with low interest 
rates and long terms) remains.   
 
                                                 
2 CDFIs and Transit-Oriented Development.  Center for Transit-Oriented Development.  2010.  Pg. 19. 
Figure 1: Hypothetical Impact of Transit 
Infrastructure Investments on Land Prices 
- from Transit Announcement to Start of 
Operations 
Source:  Reconnecting America’s Center for Transit-Oriented 
Development.  Fostering Equitable and Sustainable Transit-
Oriented Development.  Oakland, CA. January 2009. 
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High Up-Front Construction Costs  
There are a many up-front costs associated with TOD.  As discussed earlier, the land near 
transit is expensive.  In order to make up for the high land costs through increased rental 
revenue, TOD tends to be high-density development.  This often means significant 
infrastructure costs.  For example, upgrading the capacity of the sewer system can be very 
costly.  These costs are often onerous for most market-rate developers and too much for 
affordable housing developers.3  In addition, because the zoning does not frequently 
account for the proximity to the transit stop by lowering the required parking spots per unit 
or per building square footage, the provision of sufficient on-site parking can become a 
serious issue.  In order to adeptly fit the parking and the development into the urban 
context, structured parking (at a cost of around $25,000 or more per space) instead of 
surface parking is often the only viable solution.  The resulting cost of parking can often 
doom an otherwise feasible project.   
As a result of the higher land prices, on 
smaller sites and those close to transit 
stations, TOD tends to take the form of 
vertical mixed-use development.  The 
common mixed-use configuration for TOD 
is residential units over office and ground-
floor retail.  There are however many 
additional design and construction 
challenges that come with vertical mixed-
use development as compared to traditional 
single-use or even horizontal mixed-use.  
The main problem concerns how the 
various uses will be “stacked” on top of 
one another and, if and how the mechanical 
and structural systems will align.  Having 
to use “transfers” to connect the systems between the various uses can be very expensive.  
In addition, while residential units have small spaces (which often allow one to hide the 
columns in the walls), retail and office often desire larger, open spaces.  Given the fact that 
these structural members need to support the weights of the floors above, open floor plans 
will often require more expensive spanning members in the floors.  Also, depending on the 
needs for the various uses to have separate entries from the sidewalk, this can increase 
construction costs while simultaneously decreasing the percentage of leasable space.4   
Due to the increased up-front costs often required of TOD, lenders often impose stringent 
underwriting criteria such as high loan-to-value (LTV) terms which can cause great 
difficulties for the non-profit TOD developers, in particular. It is the equity and subsidy 
sources that are needed to bring down the LTV and these are hard to come by.  Hoping to 
make up the high initial costs through higher rents can be difficult in this economy to 
realize, especially for retail.   
                                                 
3 The Case for Mixed-Income Transit-Oriented Development in the Denver Region.  Center for Transit-Oriented 
Development.  2007.  Pg. 26. 
4 Venner, M. & Ecola, L.  Financing Transit-Oriented Development – Understanding and Overcoming Obstacles.  
Transportation Research Board: Journal of the Transportation Research Board.  No. 1996. Pg. 18. 
Source:  Daniel Miguez, 2011 
Figure 2:  Hypothetical Example of a Vertical 
Mixed-Use Development (Residential Units 
over Grocery/Retail) 
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Standard Underwriting Criteria Not Suitable for TOD   
Lenders want to make sure the project they finance fits into their loan portfolio and where 
it can be resold on the secondary market (which thus requires standard underwriting 
criteria). The secondary market is composed of permanent mortgage categories and loans 
are underwritten for these 19 standard product types to make it easier to sell to investors.  
The FDIC and Federal Reserve Board – both of who are involved in the oversight of the 
market - have pushed strongly for conforming in this respect.  Otherwise, they require the 
lender to jump thru hoops by means of additional project tracking, oversight, and reporting 
to investors.5 The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) have also had a large impact on the 
conformism.  Studies have shown that interest rates for conventional mortgages are 15-30 
basis points lower than nonconforming mortgages, due to the finances provided by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.6  As a result, investors need to have a compelling reason (be it a 
choice property, a unique opportunity, perfect timing in the market, etc.) to underwrite 
mixed-use projects.  Much of these requirements are due – not to the lack of familiarity of 
the product – but rather to the fact that there have been numerous examples poor 
performance of these types of projects, which may be due to the location, planning or 
execution.  This has caused lenders to be wary moving forward.   
In Summary 
Given all of these financial challenges 
facing TOD developers, the question 
remains: despite the potential for high 
returns, why would a developer (and 
their investors) want to go through the 
impending bureaucratic red tape, a 
potentially strong community backlash, 
the uphill battle to get the necessary 
approvals, the mountains of paperwork, 
the increased expenses and the very long 
timeline?  Put another way, why 
wouldn’t a developer take the safer and 
more hassle-free route of developing on 
the urban fridge (i.e. suburbia) where 
the risks of bureaucratic delay, loan 
defaults, site contamination, and cash flow problems, etc. are far less likely? Figure 3 
above graphically shows the increased challenge that TOD projects have.  Given the higher 
costs and the lower returns, they are immediately at a disadvantage given a comparable 
suburban development.  While it is true that the returns can be greater for urban infill, it 
must be understood that potential TOD projects require even greater study and careful 
deliberation to be certain that all of the assumptions are indeed viable.  
                                                 
5 Department of the Treasury, et al. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk Management 
Practices (proposed guidance with request for comment). Federal Register 71, No. 9, Jan. 13, 2006, Pg. 2302–
2307. 
6 Venner, M. & Ecola, L.  Financing Transit-Oriented Development – Understanding and Overcoming Obstacles.  
Transportation Research Board: Journal of the Transportation Research Board.  No. 1996.  Pg. 20 
Figure 3: Suburban Development’s Ability to 
Attract Equity Over Higher-Cost, Lower- 
Profit TOD 
Source:  William Kohn Fleissig.  Moving Toward TOD 3.0: 
Private Investment in TOD PowerPoint for 2010 Rail-
Volution Conference.  2010. 
7 
 
COMMON GAPS IN TOD FINANCING SOURCES 
In reviewing the literature and various consultant reports as well as through interviews with 
various staff involved in the creation of TOD Fund across the country, certain financing 
gaps frequently came up.  Many of these gaps are not unique to TOD but may be felt more 
acutely given the aforementioned challenges faced by TOD developers. 
ACQUISITION  
A report7 prepared for the Family Housing Fund in Minneapolis describes three different 
types of acquisition, with each requiring different types of financing.  The best fit will 
depend on the projected interim hold (before commencing with construction), the current 
and interim use, the type of entity acquiring the property and finally, the ultimate plan for 
redevelopment. 
Type 1: Land Acquisition with Long-Term Hold 
This generally pertains to vacant parcels which are acquired with the intent of waiting until, 
for example, the nearby station or some other neighborhood lynchpin is designed and 
constructed before commencing with the development of the parcel.  Private entities - 
unless stocked with ample sources of equity or patient debt - are usually unsuited for this 
type of acquisition.  Unless the real estate market is particularly robust, even with adequate 
low-cost capital sources with which to acquire the land, the expenses required to cover the 
holding costs (i.e. loan interest, maintenance costs, real estate taxes, insurance, and 
electricity/heating/cooling costs) over the 5+ years very often makes this type of strategy 
very difficult, if not infeasible.  As this type of acquisition is often quite difficult for private 
entities, it relies heavily on assistance from the public sector (since they do not pay 
property taxes and thus automatically have lower holding costs).  However, while possible, 
there is generally a lot of political risk involved, particularly in today’s economic climate 
and for the historical reasons mentioned earlier.  For example, while the city of 
Minneapolis acquired several parcels 20+ years ago (and has developed them since), there 
is no longer the political interest to continue this practice.  This has led developers and 
neighborhood organizations to search for other funding sources or structures (i.e. public-
private partnerships, joint developments, etc.). 
Type 2: Land Acquisition and Operation in the Interim 
When the property has a way of generating income in the interim before being redeveloped 
(i.e. thru rents, leases, and parking fees), the picture completely changes.  This type of 
acquisition typically involves developers who have large sources of equity (generally 40-50 
percent of the total development costs).  No longer concerned with the financing of an 
empty parcel, here developers are focused more on increasing returns by better managing 
the asset (i.e. via increased cash flow) than through the sale of the asset (i.e. the 
disposition).   
 
                                                 
7 Schmidt, Deidre.  For the Family Housing Fund (Minneapolis). Strategic Acquisition Fund for TOD –
Understanding the National Experience, Exploring the Needs and Opportunities in the Twin Cities Region. 2011. 
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Type 3: Quick Land Acquisition for Redevelopment 
This type of acquisition requires pro-active and flexible funding sources which allow the 
developer to move quickly, assemble the financing sources, and close on a property (often 
before a permanent financing source has been secured).   Unfortunately however, most 
financing sources have bureaucratic strings attached, or simply have an allocation process 
that is rigid and therefore unable to respond to the need for a quick turnaround (this point is 
further explored a little later in this section).  These problems have become heightened due 
to recent tightening of lending by banks which has left many developers without sufficient 
working capital.   
While the concept of the quick acquisition (possibly before permanent funding is in place) 
is frequently mentioned as a concern to TOD, there was some disagreement as the true 
viability of its occurrence.  In the current economic climate, even market-rate developers 
are having trouble accessing capital, which has opened the door for affordable housing 
developers if they are able to access enough grant and debt sources.  Given their small 
profit margins due to the rent caps that are imposed by such financing sources as the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), they need to be able to take advantage of any 
opportunity to purchase land at a lower rate.  The challenge is even greater due to the fact 
that they need to be able to borrow the necessary funds to acquire the land and begin the 
pre-development process while still looking for a construction loan.8  Unfortunately, 
federal as well as philanthropic funding sources have allocation schedules that are often too 
cumbersome and rigid to respond quickly. 
One lender interviewed however, felt strongly that there really wasn't any reason for a 
developer to acquire the land before starting the feasibility and zoning work.  He went on to 
mention that there were other ways to gain site control for planning and fundraising 
purposes which offered the developer more time to complete the preliminary steps – such 
as land options and rights of first refusal.  Just because an attractive opportunity presented 
itself, didn’t remove the developer from the responsibility making sure all of the details and 
paperwork were in place before moving forward.  
Another point of disagreement was the realistic upper limit of a long-term hold.  Several 
lenders felt that without public involvement or substantial sources of equity, a hold longer 
than 7-8 years is generally infeasible. However one lender in Boston mentioned that the 
tightening of lending sources has not only increased the competitiveness over funding 
sources, but also resulted in lengthened holding periods necessary to endure the more 
protracted allocation process.   
PRE-DEVELOPMENT 
This is commonly viewed as the most risky phase of the development process which 
typically results in the fewest lending sources.  It is the Loan-to-Value requirements of 
lenders that often present great problems to TOD developers of securing pre-development 
funds.  The initial upfront costs that are often required by TOD projects (for infrastructure 
improvements, site preparation and higher holding costs) are often difficult to justify given 
existing property values.  While it is assumed that the land values will adequately 
                                                 
8 Realizing the Potential: One Year Later.  Housing Opportunities Near Transit in a Changing Market.  Center for 
Transit-Oriented Development.  2008.  Pg. 12. 
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appreciate to pay for these initial expenses, it does not always play out as recent activity 
has shown great fluctuation of property values along rail lines.9  
PERMANENT SOURCES 
Permanent bank loans readily available in today’s market, public and private subsidy 
sources (i.e. grants) of permanent financing are quite rare.  Many developers and lenders 
involved with TOD point to this as a key issue.  Without these subsidy sources, many of the 
most risky or less alluring TOD projects are not feasible.  It is therefore of little surprise 
that there is great competition for these sources.  Furthermore, this points to the importance 
of instituting allocation policies that prioritize TOD projects.  This could be similar to 
expediting the permitting process or offering density bonuses for large civic investments or 
certain important projects.  With all of the challenges that accompany TOD and vertical 
mixed-use construction, streamlining the process would at least improve what is already a 
rather protracted development process.   
SHRINKING FINANCIAL RESOURCES OVERALL  
While there are many parties involved in the creation of TOD in the various sectors - 
public, private and non-profit (see Appendix 1) and numerous sources available for the 
different phases of development (for sources in Boston, see Appendix 10), due to Federal 
and State budget cuts, many of these grant and subsidy sources are shrinking.  For example, 
HUD has made cuts to its affordable housing HOME program and there have been changes 
in tax-credit pricing.  One interviewee in Boston mentioned the despite the fact that fact 
that the City and State have dwindling funds, there are probably 3 years’ worth of projects 
in the pipeline currently applying for resources.  In this most recent funding cycle, the City 
received 46 applications and was only able to fund 10.  In addition, another deleterious 
effect of the tightening of lending and the increased competitiveness over surviving 
funding sources has been the lengthened holding periods necessary to endure the more 
protracted allocation process.  Without sufficient reserves or capital sources to just ‘tread 
water’, more and more projects must be either mothballed or scrapped completely.   
                                                 
9 Schmidt, Deidre.  For the Family Housing Fund (Minneapolis). Strategic Acquisition Fund for TOD –
Understanding the National Experience, Exploring the Needs and Opportunities in the Twin Cities Region. 2011. 
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STRUCTURED TOD LAND ACQUISITION FUNDS 
As discussed above, TOD requires a longer time frame and higher inherent risk level than 
traditional development.  However these factors are often at odds with bank loans, which 
are typically short-term, variable rates that require a predetermined exit-strategy and 
repayment plan.  While these cautious lending terms are often unviable for affordable 
housing developers, the requirement of a predetermined take-out lender further hinders any 
opportunity of a quick land acquisition.10  Clearly there is a need for a flexible, patient and 
long-term capital source that would help cover the longer holding costs, allocated through a 
streamlined process.  This is where a TOD Land Acquisition Fund would be critical 
OVERVIEW 
Structured funds are a pool of capital from several different funders (but technically kept 
off any of funder’s balance sheets).11  Through the formation of a capital stack, the 
different return requirements and risk thresholds of the lenders are accommodated by their 
different lien positions within the stack and the timing of their repayments.  The intended 
result is a blended interest rate that is below-market.  This is crucial.  The below-market 
interest rates are typically achieved through the involvement of philanthropic foundations 
and their program-related investments (PRIs) (which usually seek a 1-2 percent return) as 
well as Federal, State and Local grants.  In terms of organization, structured funds can take 
the form of a revolving loan fund or a one-time fund.  This depends on the investment 
needs and long-term vision of the fund but will normally be decided from the beginning 
since it will heavily influence the terms and management. 
The key component to a structured fund is the “top-loss” portion.  In the event of a loan 
default, this money will be used to cover the repayments.  Because it therefore holds the 
riskiest position in the capital stack, it is typically grant money from public agencies.  Once 
the top-loss portion of the stack has been filled, other lenders, who are more risk-averse, 
are generally much more comfortable about getting involved with their funds now in a 
subordinate position.  These other players often include community foundations project-
related investments (as mentioned above), community development finance institutions 
(CDFIs) (also looking for below-market returns), and major banks typically looking to 
fulfill CRA requirements.12 
Structured funds often have an expressed purpose of facilitating acquisition and 
development of real estate – usually with a focused application (affordable housing 
generation/preservation, TOD sites, etc.).  Deidre Schmidt, in her 2011 report,13 
investigated the viability of TOD Funds in the Twin Cities and pointed out the type of 
acquisition and length of the projected hold will affect how it is financed. Her investigation 
of national precedents found that: 
                                                 
10 The Case for Mixed-Income Transit-Oriented Development in the Denver Region.  Center for Transit-Oriented 
Development.  2007.  Pg. 27. 
11 Schmidt, Deidre.  For the Family Housing Fund (Minneapolis). Strategic Acquisition Fund for TOD –
Understanding the National Experience, Exploring the Needs and Opportunities in the Twin Cities Region. 2011. 
12 CDFIs and Transit-Oriented Development.  Center for Transit-Oriented Development.  2010.  Pg. 23. 
13 Schmidt, Deidre.  For the Family Housing Fund (Minneapolis). Strategic Acquisition Fund for TOD –
Understanding the National Experience, Exploring the Needs and Opportunities in the Twin Cities Region. 2011. 
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o Short-term acquisition financing (1-5 years before potential construction) may not 
require a structured fund.  It may instead be an issue of lender liquidity or the 
availability of existing tools; 
o Financing acquisition 5-20 years before development is anticipated is often viewed as 
difficult without some type of income-generating sources due to the holding-costs 
(taxes, debt payments, maintenance costs, etc.) and the strength of the real estate 
market and;  
o Holds of ~10 years for non-income generating properties are not possible with 
structured funds given the “terms of debt that generally would likely constitute the 
bulk of a fund.” (This will be discussed further below).  Instead national examples 
[from San Francisco and Denver] have shown that having public sources equity (i.e. 
grants), make a longer-term buy-and-hold a more viable option.   
The fund could be used to facilitate the acquisition of key parcels on which to develop one 
of several needed building types along transit corridors: affordable housing, mixed-use 
housing & neighborhood retail/commercial or community facilities.  The fund might also 
provide pre-development capital to continue to help advance these the critical projects.  
Another key is to make sure these critical projects align well with State and Local funding 
allocation priorities to help ensure success.   
ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES 
TOD Funds provide access to lower cost capital thru an efficient process in order to help 
close the Loan-to-Value gap.  The fund would streamline the process for the developer by 
pre-packaging the various sources of debt and equity into one “bundle”.  Furthermore this 
bundle would leverage the capital, underwriting expertise, and technical assistance of the 
existing network of funders.  By leveraging the public investment and private capital, it 
would also respond to the equity gap and capacity challenges faced by non-profit 
developers. 
It would also manage risk in several ways.  It would encourage alternative site control 
arrangements rather than immediate acquisition.  By utilizing recoverable grant sources 
(via a revolving fund format), it would help cover the riskiest components of the funded 
projects, like option payments and other alternative site control arrangements.  As 
mentioned earlier, the PRI investments would further lower the Loan-to-Value gap at a low 
cost.   
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CASE STUDIES: TOD LAND ACQUISITION FUND BEST PRACTICES FROM 
AROUND THE COUNTRY 
According to the Center for Transit-Oriented Development (CTOD), as of 2010, there were 
15 direct acquisition or affordable housing loan funds and one TOD property fund, either in 
operation or under development, in the US.14  Six of these funds are focused in part, or 
entirely, on transit locations.  While their structures vary from revolving loan to direct 
acquisition to grant funds, when examining the TOD Funds in San Francisco, Denver and 
Minneapolis, certain common themes became apparent.  While Appendices 3-8 contain a 
great deal more information on the Funds in these three cities, we will now explore a few 
of the common themes related to the development of a TOD fund: the type of projects that 
are targeted, the ability to swap federal funds with local funds, securing the top loss reserve 
portion, and the importance of getting everyone on-board early through a clear vision and 
mission.   
TYPES OF PROJECTS TARGETED   
While the distance of the geographic coverage around the individual stations of ½-¼ mile 
for fixed-rail and ¼ mile for bus stops was generally the same across all case studies 
studied, the types of projects targeted by the TOD funds primarily varied between two 
types: affordable housing and commercial development.   
Affordable Housing 
Minneapolis’s Land Acquisition for Affordable New Development (LAAND) (see 
Appendix 6) stipulates that its funds are eligible for acquiring sites specifically for 
affordable housing with a composition of at least 20 percent of affordable units in the final 
development.  They define affordability as households earning 60 percent or less of the 
area medium income (AMI) in the Minneapolis Metro area and 80 percent in the Greater 
Minneapolis region.  The LAAND Fund also notes greater prioritization to developers 
applying who would require the longest term of affordability of the units (with a minimum 
of at least seven years for ownership units and fifteen years for rental units).15      
Instead of defining the AMI requirements at the metro versus regional level as seen above 
with the LAAND Fund, the Denver TOD Fund (see Appendix 4) instead set the AMI 
requirements for their affordable housing in terms of the type of unit.  Solely focused on 
housing, Denver’s Fund set itself the goal of creating or preserving more than 1,000 
affordable units by 2020, with a maximum of 60 percent AMI for the rental units and 95 
percent AMI for the ownership units.  Recognizing the acute problem that exists for the 
lowest income bracket, the fund also set the goal of at least 15 percent of the units being set 
aside for households making less than 30 percent of the area median income.  
San Francisco’s Transit-Oriented Affordable Housing (TOAH) Fund (see Appendix 3) took 
yet another approach by mandating that 85 percent of Fund capital be used to create and 
preserve affordable housing (the other 15 percent is to be used on community facilities, 
                                                 
14 CDFIs and Transit-Oriented Development.  Center for Transit-Oriented Development.  2010.  Pg. 24.  
15 Minnesota Housing Finance Agency.  Land Acquisition for Affordable New Development (LLAND) - Initiative 
Description.  http://www.mnhousing.gov/idc/groups/homes/documents/webcontent/mhfa_006988.pdf  
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child care centers, health clinics, fresh food markets and other neighborhood retail).16  In 
the loan documentation for each of the five loan products offered, they set the requirement 
that at least 20 percent of the housing rental units must be occupied by residents with 
household income less than or equal to 50 percent of AMI or at least 40 percent of the 
rental units occupied by residents with household income less than 60 percent of AMI. In 
terms of ownership units, they just mentioned targeting ‘low to moderate income families’.   
Having perhaps the widest range of targeted property types, Minneapolis’s Capital 
Acquisition Revolving Fund (CARF) (see Appendix 6) focuses on mixed-income rental & 
ownership housing, mixed residential/commercial buildings, and new commercial projects 
(discussed below).  For projects containing with residential units, they require at least 20 
percent of those units to be affordable (defined as less than 50 percent Minneapolis Median 
Income (MMI), which is a city affordable housing policy). 
Commercial Development 
As noted above, while Minneapolis’s Capital Acquisition Revolving Fund (CARF) does 
include fund capital for the acquisition of land to be used for affordable housing, it also 
focuses on sites for new commercial buildings as well as mixed residential/commercial 
buildings.  This makes a good deal of sense since the CARF Fund focuses on properties 
located on commercial or transit corridors or at major commercial nodes designated by The 
Minneapolis Plan, the city’s comprehensive plan and is irrespective of housing type (i.e. 
housing or commercial).  Another land acquisition fund guided by the Minneapolis Plan is 
the Great Streets Real Estate Gap Financing Program (see Appendix 7).  The Gap 
Program provides loans for catalytic commercial projects with the intent of spurring 
additional development. Projects must be located in areas designated as Great Streets 
eligible areas: commercial corridors, commercial nodes, activity centers and LRT station 
areas designated in The Minneapolis Plan for Sustainable Growth. To date the program has 
mainly supported neighborhood business districts.   
Other 
The only fund to break from the affordable housing/commercial development angle is 
Minneapolis’ Hiawatha Land Acquisition LRT Fund (see Appendix 5).  Solely focused on 
properties within 1,500 feet of a transit stop along the Hiawatha Corridor, the Fund’s Grant 
Application Guide makes no mention of any specific type of development but rather just 
the goal of “leveraging local and private commitments to transit-oriented, pedestrian 
friendly development to reinforce the Metropolitan Council’s investment in Light Rail 
Transit.”17  Furthermore, the Fund is not open to private developers or neighborhood 
development organizations but would require them to partner with the funds only eligible 
recipients: the cities of Bloomington and Minneapolis Hennepin County (which includes 
their housing, redevelopment and economic development agencies).   
                                                 
16 Brian Prater.  Metro Boston TOD Finance Working Session PowerPoint.  Low-Income Investment Fund.  2012.  
17 Metropolitan Council.  Metropolitan Council’s Hiawatha Light Rail Transit (LRT) Land Assembly Fund Grant 
Application Guide.    
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THE ABILITY TO SWAP FEDERAL FUNDS WITH LOCAL FUNDS  
Because federal grant funds come with many restrictions and reporting requirements, they 
can often hinder the process as much as they help.  To overcome this, several funds have 
found a workaround by “swapping” federal funds with local funds.  Doing so is possible 
when the eligible uses of the federal funds overlap those of the local funds.  For example, 
San Francisco found great success and was able to quickly raise fund capital by swapping 
their allocated federal funds with parking meter revenue.  The federal funds were then used 
on street improvement projects that were federally eligible.  
While this type of circumnavigation would be top strategy of all federal grant recipients, 
only projects that have the close involvement of governmental agencies are able to take 
advantage of the opportunity – as it is only these agencies that are authorized to perform 
the exchange.  In San Francisco, it was done by the Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission (MTC), the transportation planning, coordinating and financing agency for the 
nine-county San Francisco Bay Area and for federal purposes and, of note for this 
discussion, also the region’s metropolitan planning organization (MPO).  In Minneapolis, 
the governmental agency was the Metropolitan Council (also the metropolitan area’s 
regional planning agency and MPO).  When the Metropolitan Council ran into a federal 
conflict related to the disposition (i.e. eventual sale) of developer-led projects directly 
funded with federal funds (in this case these were Federal Congestion Mitigation and Air 
Quality (CMAQ) Funds), the Council was able to simply swap the CMAQ funds with local 
Hennepin Country funds that would have been used for transit operations.  The result was 
an additional $3.8 million in funds that the Hiawatha Fund could use for land acquisition.   
SECURING THE TOP LOSS PORTION 
As mentioned above, one of the key components to a structured fund is the portion of the 
capital stack referred to as the “top loss” portion.  Because these funds are the first to be 
spent to make up any shortcomings caused by a loan default, they are therefore the riskiest 
and therefore often the hardest to secure.  Frequently they are typically grant money from 
public agencies, often the state or local government.   
San Francisco’s TOAH fund undoubtedly had the easiest time securing their top loss 
portion due to the fact that the initial spark for the fund’s existence came from the 
Metropolitan Planning Commission and their willingness to put up the initial $10 Million 
and assume the risky, top loss position.  As a follow up from the previous section, it is safe 
to assume that a large portion, if not all of this $10 million came from federal funds that 
had been swapped.  The same can be said for the Hiawatha’s top loss portion coming from 
swapped CMAQ funds.   
In Denver’s case, the City stepped in with $2.5 million in top loss reserves.  The top loss 
portion is currently a topic of great debate as the Denver Fund looks to expand its 
geographic coverage beyond the city limits in order to accompany the expansion of the 
transit system.  While some reports site an additional requirement of $12 to $15 million in 
funds, it will be a difficult sell for Enterprise and the Urban Land Conservancy (who 
manage and borrow from the fund, respectively).  While they are now working alongside 
the Denver Regional Council of Governments (the region’s MPO) to make the process a 
little easier, it will still be quite difficult getting the neighboring municipalities to 
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contribute to the risky top loss pool.18  The process has been made even more difficult due 
to the fact that the TOD Fund is not considered an eligible use of federal transportation 
dollars, thus requiring all allocated federal funds be swapped with local funds if they are to 
be used.  
While Minneapolis’ Great Streets Real Estate Gap Financing Program’s Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds are not top loss per say (due to a different 
structure), the federal funds have allowed the Great Streets Program to close funding gaps 
and fund 10 projects with a total of $1.5 million.  In a conversation with a staff member 
working with the program, it was noted the CDBG funds “…are certainly not the easiest 
money in the world to use, but it can certainly close a gap in a project."  While the CDBG 
funds have increased the paperwork and reporting requirements, they have also allowed the 
Great Street Program to extend its capacity and make riskier loans which is the same effect 
of the top loss portion. 
FOSTERING BUY-IN AND CONFIDENCE WITH A CLEAR VISION AND MISSION 
With the myriad of actors involved throughout the process of TOD – each with their 
individual goals and interests (see Appendix 1) and the various scales at which TOD exists 
(regional, corridor, station area and site), it is vital for fund organizers to develop a clear 
vision for the fund early on.  The planning process can be lengthy – as proven by the 
Denver TOD Fund and San Francisco TOAH Fund both requiring two to three years to go 
from initial conception to operation and loan deployment.  Over that period of time, there 
are thousands of decisions that need to be made, priorities that need to be set, participants 
that need to be coordinated, etc.  Therefore the importance of fostering a collective vision, 
although it may certainly evolve and change as the process moves along cannot be 
understated.   
Given the network-like quality of transit systems and the intent of improving efficiency and 
the cost-effectiveness of transportation investments, successful TOD planning takes place 
at the regional level (often in concert with strategic or comprehensive plan).19  While some 
funds such as Minneapolis’ Hiawatha Fund are solely focused on a single transit corridor, 
others such as the San Francisco’s TOAH fund, need to coordinate and make loans over the 
entire 9-county Bay Area.  While the Bay Area’s has a long history of advocacy around 
transit equity and affordable housing which has undoubtedly helped facilitate the public 
buy-in process by fostering a general level of education around the issues, building 
collaborating and consensus is a primary issue.  It is therefore of little coincidence that an 
entity like the Great Communities Collaborative which is a collaboration of 24 advocacy 
organizations, transit advocacy and research non-profits and community foundations 
throughout the Bay Area was chosen to lead the organization of the Fund.   
In Minneapolis, the Metropolitan Council, with its coverage of the Twin Cities 7-county 
metropolitan area in addition to its involvement in several of Minneapolis’ TOD funds, 
stressed a similar priority in collective planning.  In Denver, while the geographic range of 
the TOD Fund is currently limited to City boundaries, once the Fund expands into the 
                                                 
18 Schmidt, Deidre.  For the Family Housing Fund (Minneapolis). Strategic Acquisition Fund for TOD –
Understanding the National Experience, Exploring the Needs and Opportunities in the Twin Cities Region. 2011. 
19 Transit-Oriented Development Tools for Metropolitan Planning Organizations.  Center for Transit-Oriented 
Development.  2010.  Pg. 9.  
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neighboring municipalities, the challenge of developing a collective vision and 
coordinating the entire process will greatly increase.  As noted above, the organizations 
involved with the Fund have already developed a working relationship with the Denver 
Regional Council of Governments to help facilitate the transition.  One positive harbinger 
is the fact that metro Denver voters have already passed the half-cent sales tax increase to 
fund new transit infrastructure and thus shown their strong buy-in to the concept.  The 
same level of optimism and collective support cannot be said for the land acquisition funds 
in the Minneapolis metro area.  This is due in large part to voter - and therefore City - 
aversion to the acquisition of land for private development (as noted earlier).  There is little 
doubt this is most likely to blame for the fact that the Hiawatha, CARF and LAAND Funds 
have not been able generate below-market interest rates (due to a lack of interest-free or 
cheap capital donations from the City) and therefore have not made a loan in almost a 
decade, if at all.  Speaking with several of the staff involved in Minneapolis’ Funds, it 
became clear that until there is a change of opinions from the general public, the Funds 
would remain unused, no matter how well conceived  and structured they are.     
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CREATING A TOD FUND IN BOSTON 
Over the past years, there has been growing interest and attention in Boston around the 
effort to increase the ability of TOD developers (particularly those building affordable 
housing) to access necessary capital sources - predevelopment, acquisition, construction 
and permanent financing.  There was a strong desire expressed by the development 
community for: (1) low interest, patient and flexible capital, (2) Higher loan to value limits; 
and (3) Help with carrying costs.  In order to galvanize interest and organize the effort 
regionally, the Metro Boston Consortium for Sustainable Communities (headed by The 
Metropolitan Area Planning Commission - the region’s MPO), assembled an advisory 
committee to design the new TOD funding program.  The Committee was composed of the 
Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD), quasi-
public finance entities, Boston LISC, neighborhood CDCs, philanthropies, the City of 
Boston, and local municipalities among others.20  Their goal was to decide if a completely 
new structured funding source (i.e. a TOD Fund) was needed or instead if efforts to better 
supplement, support and coordinate the various existing TOD financing sources was a best 
strategy moving forward.   
In order to help define the scope of the fund early on, five corridors were selected to be 
eligible to use TOD Funds (see list below).  They were selected due to the fact that they 
contained over 1,600 units of affordable & mixed-income housing and over 300,000 square 
feet of commercial space (either currently in the development pipeline or already planned).   
 The Fairmount Corridor – This would include the entire 8-mile commuter rail line in 
south Boston which currently has four new stations under construction and will soon 
switch to light rail.   
 The Orange Line – This would focus on the southern portion of the Orange Line - 
particularly the Jackson Square and Forest Hills stations.  
 Green Line Extension into Somerville/Medford – This would include the 3¼-mile rail 
extension to the existing Green Line (from the existing terminus of Lechmere station 
in East Cambridge northward to a new terminus on College Avenue in Medford, 
MA).   
 Chelsea/Revere Transit Corridor – This would include the transit (the Blue Line) and 
the key bus routes (potentially the 111, 116 and 117 routes). 
 The Dudley Square Area – This would mainly focus on the area immediately near the 
intersection of Washington St., Dudley St., and Malcolm X Blvd. in south Boston 
(exact limit of coverage area not yet determined) 
 
Through discussions amongst the various stakeholders, including lenders, developers, city 
staff, and local CDC staff over the past year, it has become evident that a structured fund 
(like the San Francisco, Denver and Minneapolis models, with numerous sources of capital 
and complicated risk waterfall structures) was probably not the best and most favored 
option for Boston.  This was due in part to the perception that these types of funds are very 
complicated to operate in addition to the fact that some of the lenders may have been 
resistant to the idea of having to accept different underwriting criteria or give up control of 
their own capital once it was included in the Fund’s pool.   
                                                 
20 Metro Boston Consortium for Sustainable Communities.  Three-Year Work Plan.  2011. 
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Another factor was the different set of assets and shortcomings in Boston.  Whereas the 
Twin Cities TOD Fund report recommended a structured fund to help address liquidity 
problems of some of the CDFI lenders, this is not the main issue in Boston due to the 
strong network of pre-development and acquisition lenders (see Appendix 11).  Instead, 
Boston’s main lending shortcoming falls in the loan-to-value (LTV) gaps.  Due to the 
increased up-front costs often required of TOD, the high LTV imposed by lenders has 
caused great difficulties for the non-profit TOD developers, in particular. It is the equity 
and subsidy sources that are needed to bring down the LTV and these are hard to come by.   
To address the issue of the LTV gap, LISC has proposed a version of a Credit 
Enhancement Fund that would provide participation loans which would come in behind the 
lead lender’s mortgage in order to make up the difference between what is needed and what 
developers can currently borrow from the array of lenders in Massachusetts.  The idea is 
that if a developer could get an 80-90 percent LTV acquisition loan from the lender, the 
Fund would come in with a loan that would both close the gap (by covering the residual up 
to 100 percent LTV) and also provide additional funds (up to 110-120 percent LTV) with 
the purpose of covering some of the carrying and pre-development costs (in addition to the 
built-in interest reserve).   
The “participation” aspect comes from the fact that one of the lenders in the Fund network 
would buy a portion of the lead lender’s (i.e. the first lender) loan - in this case of Boston, 
usually 30-40 percent of the LTV.  These types of sales are typical in the industry as it is a 
way for lenders to deploy their capital by making such investments.  The process is 
documented via a "participation agreement" with the lead lender outlining the terms of the 
participation, participation rate, reporting requirements and default provisions.  The 
advantage to this setup is that it allows the borrower to shop around for the best lending 
rate in addition to the fact that that it should result in some level of lending competition 
which will help keep lending rates low.  It also allows the purchasing lender to deploy 
capital while at the same time freeing up capital for the lead lender to use elsewhere.  
While the fund is working behind the scenes to help fill the gap, it will be ‘invisible’ to the 
borrower as he or she will only interact with the lead lender and not through the Fund’s 
structure.  In exchange for this increased work and responsibility, the lead lender has the 
right to approve the purchaser of the share of the loan.  In conversations with LISC Boston, 
it became clear that while they proposed a participation structure, it was just one of several 
ways to bring some credit enhancement to this specific group of loans.  The loans could 
also be made as second mortgages instead but this would result in largely the same thing 
(since the participation agreement would put it in the top loss position anyway).                     
SITE ACQUISITION FINANCING SOURCES IN BOSTON  
While there is an abundance of financing sources commonly used by developers – both 
market-rate and especially affordable housing, that list dwindles considerably when only 
counting the number that may be used to acquire, hold, and prepare land near transit 
stations for TOD.  Further, many traditional funding sources— including Community 
Development Block Grants (CDBG), and HOME Investment Partnerships Program, cannot 
be used to purchase and hold land.  The list below is an abbreviated sample of funding 
sources that are available in the City of Boston.  See Appendix 12 for more information.  
Note: this list includes only sources that are available to secure site control or acquire 
property as opposed to permanent sources that include acquisition as an eligible cost.   
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 Neighborhood Stabilization Funds - A component of the HUD’s Community 
Development Block Grant Program, the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) 
is focused on the stabilization of communities that have suffered from foreclosures 
and abandonment.  NSP Funds can be used to establish a land bank for foreclosed 
homes and properties.   
 Priority Development Fund – Funds from this City program can be used to assist 
communities identify and implement strategies to increase the production of 
affordable housing, both rental and homeownership.  Eligible uses include gaining 
site control, site analysis, and other activities associated with the production of 
affordable housing in municipally owned/controlled sites.  
 Leading the Way III Program – This City program is a partnership of the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority and the Department of Neighborhood Development.  As 
part of the Leading the Way III program, the City will be making multi-property 
purchases of Real Estate Owned (REO) (i.e. bank owned) properties directly from the 
lenders.  The properties will then be made available to homebuyers, contractors, 
developers, and non-profits for renovation and re-occupancy.    While this is more 
directed at stabilization and quick turnaround, there may be opportunity for a joint 
development or public private partnership.    
 General Fund Revenues or General Activity Bonds – Traditionally the most common 
source of funding for infrastructure and other large price tag aspects associated with 
TOD (i.e., parking decks, public amenities, etc.).  
 Developer Working Capital – This is the developer’s own equity reserves.  Generally, 
the larger and better established developers usually have the advantage of possessing 
larger equity reserves from which to draw from in times of need. 
 The Various CDFIs and Quasi-Public Agencies listed in Appendix 13 – These groups 
provide a great deal of the financing – mostly pre-development and acquisition 
financing for TODs (which is often deemed too risky for traditional lenders – i.e. 
banks).   
 Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative’s Community Land Trust – The Dudley 
Neighbors Inc. has the power to use eminent domain to acquire privately-owned 
vacant parcels within the “Dudley Triangle” of South Boston.   The Trust is focused 
on preserving affordable housing.   
ORGANIZING THE BOSTON FUND 
On March 14th, 2012, a TOD Finance Working Session was convened by the MAPC on 
behalf of the Metro Boston Consortium for Sustainable Communities.  Several staff from 
TOD Fund programs across the country presented on their experiences and best practices.  
At the meeting, Boston LISC proposed a plan of how the TOD fund would look like credit 
enhancement aspects21; that plan is outlined below:      
                                                 
21 Low Income Support Corporation.  Equitable Transit Oriented Development in Greater Boston - Proposal for a 
Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) Fund PowerPoint Presentation.  2012 
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Proposed Terms 
o Rate: CDFI lenders: 6 to 7 percent, LISC: 4.5 to 6 percent, PRI lenders: 2 percent.  
The goal is a weighted net average of around 5 percent.   
 LISC mentioned that it was still too early to know if the 5 percent interest rate 
was possible.  In addition to several lending requirements still needing to be 
nailed down, the cost of funds and administrative fees still needed to be 
included in the interest rate calculation.                             
 Due to the fact that the foundation PRI low-interest money will enable much 
of the fund, the final structure and arrangement will greatly depend on their 
risk tolerances and underwriting preferences. 
o Term: 3-5 years  
 LISC mentioned that project holds near or around 10 years simply wouldn’t 
work);   
o Loan to Value: Up to 110-120 percent on secured loans;  
o Unsecured predevelopment loans may be available for public land;  
o Loans would be made for the Acquisition of strategic properties, Predevelopment and 
Holding Costs; 
o Eligible Uses: Affordable housing, mixed use housing and neighborhood retail, 
commercial or community space (non-housing investments to be limited to a small 
percentage of fund); 
o Repayment will be due at project construction closing.   
 
Figure 4: A Basic Breakdown of the Fund’s Capital Stack 
Position Organization Amount 
Top Loss A Still-to-be-Determined Public Source $1-$2 Million 
PRI capital Foundations $4-$6 Million 
CDFI Funds CDFIs $25+ Million 
Total  $30-35 Million 
 
The Boston TOD Fund Capital Stack is anticipated to initially be around $30-35 Million 
(with plans to scale up as it gains traction).  It is projected to require a top loss portion of 
about $1-2 Million.  Although a source has yet to be identified, the Advisory Committee 
has been in discussion recently with the Massachusetts State Executive Office of Housing 
and Economic Development (EOHED) who has recommended the Committee work with 
either MassDevelopment or MassHousing in order to fill the gap.  Both of these quasi-
public entities were recommended due to the fact that that they have their own lenders and 
investors as well as their own capital sources which would lend a degree of flexibility to 
the Fund.  However, until a donor is secured and their lending requirements to the TOD 
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Fund are nailed down, everything is really up in the air and, therefore, a hypothetical 
exercise. The foundations with their vital PRI funds have made it clear that they will not 
commit funds until the public sector commitment to this top loss piece.   
Philanthropic Project Related Investments (PRIs), seeking a 1-2 percent return, would 
make up about total of about $4-6 million.  It is this below-market portion, in additional to 
public grants, as previously mentioned, that allow the overall blended rate of a Fund’s 
entire capital stack to fall below-market.   Finally, the remaining $25 million would come 
from CDFIs and private banks. (See Appendix 13 for a list of both the potential 
Philanthropic as well as CDFI lenders). 
While San Francisco had great success by “swapping” restricted federal funds with more 
flexible locally generated funds, LISC mentioned an aversion to working with Federal 
funds due to the accompanying restrictions and reporting requirements.  Either way, the 
option to do so does not exist in Boston due to the fact that unlike the MTC, LISC is 
neither an MPO nor a governmental agency which means that they are not an eligible 
conduit for this type of action.  While the TOD Fund could partner with the Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) to swap funds, the MBTA is unfortunately in 
extreme financial difficulty which nullifies any possibilities there.  Instead, LISC has 
expressed a desire to have the TOD Fund work alongside various existing sources (like the 
Community Challenge Grant money).      
Oversight (Fund Management) 
As currently proposed, LISC will manage the investment pool of PRI and top loss funds, 
participate with originating lenders, and manage the complementary recoverable grant 
program.  Their administrative fees will be covered by the grants or public equity sources 
as well as loan fees.  As mentioned earlier, the underwriting process will be coordinated 
directly with CDFI first lender for the sake of efficiency.  
IMPACT ON TOD IN BOSTON 
The fund is expected to have an immediate impact due to the fact that it was explicitly 
sized to close the pre-development or acquisition gaps that existed for any TOD project 
along the specified corridors.  Appendix 14 shows the pre-development and acquisition 
gaps for 11 projects along the Fairmount Corridor.22 On the acquisition side, the chart 
shows a total budget for the 11 projects of $6,177,300 with $6,037,929 (i.e. 98 percent) 
committed.  On the predevelopment side, a total of $6,849,701 is budgeted with only 
$4,340,405 (i.e. 63 percent) committed.  However, when the total potential combined 
acquisition and pre-development costs are calculated (and the Total Project Acquisition 
Budget is factored in, a total potential need of these 11 projects of $13,884,155 is the result.  
This $13.8 million is commensurate given the fact that LISC anticipates the total fund 
budget to fall somewhere between $25 and $35 million for all five corridors.  
It was pointed out during interviews that this TOD fund is really for the smaller developers 
who do not have a strong balance sheet and therefore do not have access to other sources of 
capital (like for example banks) to cover all of their pre-development and acquisition 
                                                 
22 It should be noted that this chart is about 5 months old and in the interim, three or four of the projects have 
become no longer viable. 
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needs.  While the financially stronger, more stable and generally larger developers & CDCs 
will probably be able to get by without the Fund. 
One illustrative example of where the Fund would play a vital role pertains to an ongoing 
project of a CDC in Boston which currently has $50,000 of outstanding expenses that (for 
reasons unknown) the lender will not fund.  Unless the CDC can find a way of securing the 
$50,000 which is owed to current participants (attorney, architect, engineer, transportation 
and traffic planner) those parties will not continue to work and probably pursue legal 
avenues.  Being a smaller CDC who does not have the ability to start a line of credit from 
MassHousing Partnership or one of the banks that has been traditionally loans to the CDC, 
means they have a serious issue moving forward.  Beyond the anticipated issues and 
challenges that accompany TOD and are planned for well in advance, such a TOD Fund 
can be a valuable resource when surprises pop up as well.   
Beyond the provision of new housing units, the Fund would also help preserve affordable 
units along the five corridors.  As is too often the case, in order to cover the high costs 
associated with TOD, the rents in the new developments are often too high for existing 
residents to pay.  Even if one’s apartment or home is not bought up and redeveloped, the 
increased property taxes in the neighborhood that often result from the new development 
can also have the deleterious effect of effectively pricing out the established residents.  
Unless protected by inclusionary zoning policies or incentive programs to promote the 
construction of new affordable units, it can lead to displacement.  The sad thing is that it is 
often these low-income residents who rely the most on the transit as their sole mode of 
transportation.  Therefore, one of the goals of Boston’s TOD Fund is to help protect the 
affordable units along the five corridors and protect the residents from displacement once 
the housing market improves and the development pressures return. 
REMAINING DECISIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
o Filling the Remaining Financing Gaps - In conversations with LISC, it was 
mentioned that foundation PRI, top loss and recoverable grant funding still needs to 
be secured.  In addition, it will need to be determined if HUD Community Challenge 
Planning Grant money could be used to help fill the top loss portion.  Both the City of 
Boston and the City of Somerville were recently awarded Community Challenge 
Grant money from HUD.  While it is quite possible that these funds could be used to 
help fill the Top Loss portion, there is some degree of uncertainty as to whether the 
TOD Fund would be considered an eligible use.  While currently under investigation, 
one interviewee mentioned a potential work-around whereby the funds might be able 
to be “housed” at LISC instead of in the TOD Fund.  This is due to HUD’s aversion 
to having its funds intermingled with other funds.  
o Aligning State and Local TOD Policies with the Fund - Continue the work currently 
underway by the Metro Boston Consortium for Sustainable Communities Advisory 
Committee of aligning the policies and focus of the Fund with the TOD policies as 
well as funding policies of the region and state.  Yet in addition to aligning the TOD 
Fund with the State’s policies, there are also lobbying efforts to get the State of 
Massachusetts to explicitly prioritize TOD in its funding allocations.  While there 
currently are points for TOD in the State LIHTC Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP), in 
a few of the interviews, it became clear that there is a general frustration with the way 
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that the QAP’s 182 points are awarded (in order to rank projects for funding).  
Several people mentioned that the way the points are allocated, made it difficult for 
TOD projects to claim their legitimate share while others mentioned the lack of 
transparency in the allocation process.  While discussions are currently underway in 
addition to the fact that there are several high-level staff members at the State level 
sympathetic to TOD, it is not certain if things will change anytime soon.  However, if 
TOD did become a priority for state funding, it would potentially both lower the 
holding costs and shorten the holding period for the projects that were able to receive 
funding.  Interestingly TOD becoming a State priority would also potentially reduce 
the need for a TOD Fund as the State funding would overlap that of the TOD Fund.  
This would of course be a good problem for the Fund to have.   
o A Business Plan needs to be created for the fund.  A business plan specifically 
identifies the development opportunities around the various transit stations.  
Progressing from earlier preliminary meetings, the creation of the Plan is generally 
seen as an important step whereby many of the initial ideas are analyzed and explored 
in context.  It will undertake a regional analysis of the station areas in terms of 
housing stock, land supply, income, relevant public policies, etc.23  These results will 
further inform the goals of the Fund.  Finally, the Business Plan can help define the 
operations of the fund as well as next steps moving forward.  
o Launch the Fund - LISC has indicated that the Fund is anticipated to launch in later 
2012 or early 2013.  
CONCLUSION 
Speaking with several people involved with the creation of the Boston TOD Fund, one gets 
the impression that while there are several pieces of the Fund still to be decided, that a 
Fund will eventually be created.  Learning from their national peers, understanding the 
realistic limits of their own capabilities as well as the unique strengths and weaknesses of 
the lending environment in Boston, LISC’s proposed structure has taken the Fund in a 
different direction that most others, yet one that better utilizes Boston’s current funding 
assets.  Already several years of study and analysis into the process, some of the 
participants are growing frustrated with both the pace and the distant projected completion 
date.  Yet the vast majority also understands the potential for immediate impact with 1,600 
units of affordable & mixed-income housing and over 300,000 square feet of commercial 
space either currently in the development pipeline or already through the planning process 
along the five corridors.  According to the Boston Foundation’s 2002 Boston Indicators 
Report, Boston is the fourth most expensive housing market in the US, 181 percent above 
the national average.24  The report also notes that a minimum-wage worker would need to 
work 153 hours each week to afford an average, market rate two-bedroom in Boston.  This 
sheds more light on the vital importance for the TOD Fund to succeed.   Once the economy 
recovers and the TOD Fund is in place and fully operational, exciting change will occur 
around the city.  Come 15 years’ time, things should look quite different in Boston.   
                                                 
23 Mixed-Income TOD Acquisition Fund – Business Plan Framework.  Center for Transit-Oriented Development.  
2008. 
24 The Boston Foundation.  Boston Indicators Report 2002.  http://www.tbf.org/indicators/  
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APPENDICIES 
APPENDIX 1: BACKGROUND – HOW TOD IS NORMALLY FINANCED  
On the surface, the financing of TOD is no different than any other real estate project.  Land needs to be acquired and the construction 
and permanent loan secured.  Debt and Equity sources must be sourced as needed.  One area where the financing does differ however is 
when the TOD involves affordable housing.  These projects are eligible for an additional range of financing that market rate developers 
are not.  Many of the finance sources and tools that will be discussed later on will deal with the unique challenges to an affordable 
housing developer as they complete for funding with everyone else.      
 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
 Public Agencies 
 Transit Agencies – through Joint developments of publicly-held land, will leverage the direct investment in TOD for increases in 
ridership or revenue 
 Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) – often invest in development projects that shape land use and transportation patterns 
 Housing Authorities  
 Urban Redevelopment/Renewal Authorities 
 Local Governments - through TIFs or other public 
investments     
PRIVATE SECTOR 
 Market-Rate Developers 
 Affordable Housing Developers 
 Philanthropic Foundations – through such investment 
vehicles as Project Related Investments (PRIs).   
 Lenders (i.e. Banks, CDFI’s, etc.)  
NON-PROFIT SECTOR 
 Non-Profit Agencies  
 Non-Profit Community Investment or Revitalization 
Funds 
Source:  Reconnecting America’s Center for Transit-Oriented Development.  
Tools for MPO’s.  Oakland, CA. January 2011. 
Figure 5: The myriad of actors participating in the creation of TOD: 
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APPENDIX 2: TOD IMPLEMENTATION STEPS: THE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Implantation 
Step Actions 
Components 
Financed 
Primary 
Financing 
Step 
Secondary 
Financing 
Step 
Key Finance 
Criteria 
Criteria 
Influence 
Impacts on 
TOD 
Land 
Assemblage 
 Master Plan with land 
use phasing 
 Private land acquisition 
 “Joint Development” 
agreements 
 Housing or 
redevelopment agency 
land acquisition 
 Land 
procurement 
 Development 
project planning 
& zoning 
Banks Private 
equity 
Feasibility of 
real estate 
development 
Land purchased 
where 
government is 
willing to 
rezone for 
density 
Some stations 
have little or no 
development 
Infrastructure 
Development 
 Municipal 
improvements (utilities, 
arterials, etc.) 
 Other improvements 
funded thru privately 
funded Special Districts 
 Roadways 
 Sidewalks 
 Bike lanes 
 Bus stops 
 Parking 
 Open space, 
Trails, Parks 
Public 
Infrastructure 
Bonds 
Region, 
Local, 
Developer, 
Transit 
Level of 
earmarked 
revenue from 
general fund of 
property 
assessment 
districts 
Quality of 
infrastructure 
determined by 
real estate tax 
potential of new 
development 
Development 
must have high-
end component 
because 
commercial 
property values 
are determined 
by profitability 
Vertical 
Development 
 Environmental Impact 
Report 
 Detailed market 
analysis 
 Parking phasing 
 Community benefits 
 Detailed design 
 Project construction 
 Design 
 Entitlements 
 Sustainability 
infrastructure 
 Affordable 
housing 
 Local & Social 
equity goals 
 Construction  
Banks Private 
equity, 
Foundation 
grants, State 
& Local 
programs, 
LIHTC, 
NMTC 
Net Operating 
Income (NOI) 
Development 
occurs in 
profitable 
locations (high 
revenue, low 
cost) 
Development 
may or may not 
occur because 
station area may 
not be as 
profitable as 
other sites 
Source:  Reconnecting America’s Center for Transit-Oriented Development.  Fostering Equitable and Sustainable TOD – Briefing Papers.  Oakland, CA. 2009.  
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APPENDIX 3: CASE STUDY: THE SAN FRANCISCO TRANSIT-ORIENTED AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING (TOAH) FUND    
(TOAH Fund Website Link) 
The Bay Area Transit-Oriented Affordable Housing Fund was created in 2011 to promote 
the creation of equitable TOD across the 9-county Bay Area.  It targets the acquisition of 
property for affordable and mixed-income housing sites located near transit.   
Participants:  Great Communities Collaborative, Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission, and the Association of Bay Area Governments were leaders in the fund.  
The by three foundations: Ford, Silicon Valley and San Francisco The Ford, Silicon 
Valley and San Francisco Foundations as well as the Living Cities Catalyst Fund 
provided start-up grants.  Originating loans came from the CDFI Consortium: the Low-
Income Investment Fund (LIIF), the Corporation for Supportive Housing (CSH), the 
Enterprise Community Loan Fund (ECLF), the Local Initiative Support Corporation 
(LISC), the Northern California Community Loan Fund (NCCLF) and the Opportunity 
Fund.  Finally, senior lenders involved were Citi and Morgan Stanley.  One of the reasons 
for the high investment of the banks was due to the fact that much of their CRA 
investment requirements were within the 9-county area.   
Geography:  Eligible properties for the fund are sites within one-half mile of fixed-rail 
transit stations or within one-quarter mile of major bus stops.  The fund manager, the 
Low-Income Investment Fund (LIIF), is responsible for making sure that the funds are 
distributed across the area.   
In terms of funding priorities, the fund targets 85 percent of Fund capital towards the 
creation and preservation of affordable housing and the other 15 percent towards community 
facilities, health clinics, child care centers, fresh food markets and other neighborhood retail. 
Process 
The initial spark for the fund came from the Metropolitan Planning Commission and their 
willingness to put up the initial $10 Million and assume the risky, top loss position.  They 
sent out an RFP soliciting other donors (as they wanted to leverage their resources 3:1).   
Incredibly, the entire process took just 11 months.  A major factor in this lightning speed 
was the groundwork laid by the previous decades of transit equity and affordable housing 
advocacy.  There was a strong level of understanding by all parties.   They also benefited 
greatly by having the MTC - a strong, well-respected and well-connected regional planning 
organization - leading the effort.  Having the MTC on board from the beginning not only 
have the Fund a presence and a strong leader but greatly facilitated the adoption across the 
9-county area.     
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Fund Structure 
The Fund’s investment horizon is 10 years with an estimated 5 years being required to 
deploy the initial round of loans.  At the end of the investment period, any remaining MTC 
funds (minus expenses and fees), may be returned to MTC, who may decide to reinvest 
them at that time.  
Figure 6: Breakdown of the TOAH Fund’s Capital Stack 
Type Organization Amount 
Equity or Grant 
Funds 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission  
(City of San Francisco) $10 million 
Foundation 
PRIs and 
Flexible Loans 
Ford Foundation, San Francisco Foundation, Silicon 
Valley Community Foundation, and Living Cities Catalyst 
Fund plus previously mentioned CDFI 
originator/investors: (Local Initiative Support Corporation 
(LISC), Enterprise, Corporation for Supportive Housing 
(CSH), Opportunity Fund and Northern California 
Community Loan Fund (NCCLF) 
$15 million 
Commercial 
Debt Citi and Morgan Stanley $25 million 
 TOTAL $ 50 Million
Oversight:  The fund is managed by LIIF (also an originating lender) who has past 
experience of raising and managing several structured funds.  For higher-level oversight, 
the TOAH Fund has both an Advisory Committee and a Credit Committee. The 12-
member Advisory Committee focuses on the programmatic oversight and evaluation 
(with no legal authority over the fund) while the 6 member Credit Committee focuses on 
reviewing potential investments. 
Products and Terms 
The TOAH offers 5 different loan products including: Predevelopment, Acquisition, 
Construction, Mini-Perm and Leverage (with New Markets Tax Credits) loans (see Figure 7 
below). The wide range reflects the variety of applications as needs as well as the desire to 
diversify the fund’s investments.  The maximum loan term for all of the loan choices is 
seven years. The Fund is open to both for- and non-profit private and public entities.  It is 
noted that developers are the targeted borrowers due that fact that they are perceived as 
being best able to assess and manage risk.25   
 
 
                                                 
25 Schmidt, Deidre.  For the Family Housing Fund (Minneapolis). Strategic Acquisition Fund for TOD –
Understanding the National Experience, Exploring the Needs and Opportunities in the Twin Cities Region. 2011. 
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Figure 7: The Various TOAH Loan Products 
Type Details 
Predevelopment 
Loans 
These loans may be used for a broad range of activities, including but 
not limited to: architecture, engineering, environmental studies, soils 
reports, surveys, market studies, appraisals, deposits or other site 
control expenses, escrow, title, and brokers fees, hazard insurance, 
liability insurance, property taxes, site security, financing fees, and debt 
service expenses.  
They are generally secured loans.  The CDFIs provide additional 
unsecured loans.  
Acquisition 
Loans 
Eligible Uses: Multifamily rental housing; Homeownership; Mixed-Use 
Projects; and Community Facilities and Catalytic Neighborhood 
Projects.  Acquisition of vacant land and operating housing or 
commercial properties, including predevelopment expenses, will be 
considered where the intent is to preserve and/or improve housing 
affordability or address another community need.  
The potentially longer term associated with these loans is intended to 
allow developers sufficient time to assemble multiple parcels of land 
into a single TOD project. The potentially higher loan-to-value will 
reduce the need for developers to line up multiple sources of financing, 
enabling them to make offers on available land quickly within a 
competitive timeframe. 
Terms: Up to 110 percent LTV, 7-year term, and a 4 to 4.5 percent 
interest rate.  The maximum loan commitment amount is $7,500,000, 
including a maximum of $750,000 for predevelopment expenses.  
Repayment: Interest-only payments with principal due at maturity. 
Construction 
Bridge Loans 
These loans may be used to bridge construction funding to either larger 
or longer-term financing. The loan purpose may be new construction or 
rehabilitation. It is anticipated that most construction bridge financing 
will be provided to borrowers that have permanent public funding 
sources identified and committed but are waiting for funding to occur. 
This product will help bridge the gap in the intervening time period. 
Construction-to- 
Mini-Permanent 
Loans 
Up to 7 years, 4-6 percent interest rate  
Loans may be used for construction financing (new or rehabilitation) 
followed by a mini-permanent takeout. This product will primarily be 
used for development of community facilities, child care centers, and 
neighborhood retail, including fresh foods markets. 
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Leveraged 
Loans 
These loans may be used to fund eligible predevelopment, acquisition, 
construction, and/or mini-permanent financing to leverage an 
investment into a New Market Tax Credit (NMTC) eligible transaction, 
which could be community facilities, neighborhood retail, fresh foods 
markets, child care centers, etc. 
Source: http://bayareatod.com/ and Prater, Metro Boston TOD Finance Working Session Powerpoint 
Presentation, 2012. 
Activity to Date 
Currently, TOAH has closed two loans (which are outlined below), approved 2 others and 
has 3 more in the immediate pipeline. Together, these 5 projects represent approximately 
$17.5m or 31 percent of the total fund. Interestingly, half of the projects have some means 
of interim income generation, be it via billboards, parking, etc.).26  
One of the factors for success has been the stability and strength of the San Francisco real 
estate market.  Despite the recent economic downturn, because the prices have remained 
relatively quite stable, investors have felt less risk-adverse and therefore willing to invest.   
 
Project: Eddy & Taylor Family Housing 
Location: San Francisco, CA 
Financing:  
o (1st TOAH Fund loan) A $7.2 million 
TOAH acquisition loan  
o The project received another $5.8 million 
in subordinated financing from San 
Francisco’s Mayor’s Office of Housing 
(MOH)   
Housing Units: 153 
Retail Space: 12,000 square feet 
The nonprofit developer Tenderloin Neighborhood Development Corp.is developing a 
parking lot into a 14-story building with affordable housing and retail space planned to 
attract a grocery store to this underserved community. The site is located just two blocks 
from the Powell Street BART station, a major transit hub in San Francisco. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Schmidt, Deidre.  For the Family Housing Fund (Minneapolis). Strategic Acquisition Fund for TOD –
Understanding the National Experience, Exploring the Needs and Opportunities in the Twin Cities Region. 2011. 
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Project: Leigh Avenue Senior Apartments 
Location: San Jose, CA 
Financing:  
o A $2.9 million TOAH acquisition loan 
o Future support from city of San Jose 
Housing Units: 64 
Retail Space: 7,000 square feet 
Non-profit and pioneering Bay Area green 
building developer, First Community Housing, will build a mixed-use, affordable, green, 
senior housing development in San Jose. All 64 units will be affordable, senior housing 
and 35 percent will be dedicated to residents needing in-home services. The commercial 
space will house dental offices. The development is located near a VTA Light Rail 
station and the developer plans to provide free transit passes for all residents. 
Key Take-Aways 
 Importance of regional buy-in and communication throughout the process.  This will 
greatly facilitate not only the creation of the fund but the management as well.   
 A key and innovative factor that facilitated the rapid creation of the fund was the 
ability to substitute local funds for federal funds.  Because federal grant funds come 
with many restrictions and reporting requirements, they can often hurt as much as 
they help.  However, by “swapping” federal with local funds (in essence, switching 
the use of each of the funds, capital flexibility can be restored).  This ability to swap 
the funds was due to the fact that MTC is a governmental agency.  MTC was able to 
swap the federal money with meter revenue and use the federal funds on street 
improvement projects that were federally eligible.  
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APPENDIX 4: CASE STUDY: THE DENVER TOD FUND  
(Denver TOD Fund Website Link)  
The original catalyst for the fund was an effort to leverage (and therefore win) a $2.25 
million MacArthur Foundation Windows of Opportunity grant (which targeted the 
preservation of affordable rental housing).  The Fund was intended to help direct future 
development along the ambitious public transportation plans of 122 miles of commuter and 
light rail, 18 miles of bus rapid transit service, and 57 new rail stations that were anticipated 
in the Denver region by 2018.  (This was enabled in 2004 by Denver voters who passed a 
sales tax referendum valued at $4.7 billion).   Its goal was to support the creation and 
preservation of over 1,000 affordable housing units through strategic property acquisition 
along both current and future transit corridors (at the time, affordable units made up less 
than 5 percent of the proposed or built units along the corridors).  The TOD Fund provides a 
mechanism to purchase land that is located a half-mile or closer to current and planned light 
rail stations and bus stops for the creation of new affordable homes, as well as to preserve 
existing affordable rental housing in these corridors. The $30 million investment will 
leverage over $500 million in local economic development activity, serving many 
economically challenged neighborhoods in Metro Denver with construction and permanent 
job creation. The Fund will also directly benefit low-income households that on average 
spend 60 percent of their gross income on housing and transportation expenses combined. 
Participants: Urban Land Conservancy, Enterprise Community Partners, the City and 
County of Denver and several other investors  
Geography: Eligible properties for the fund are sites within one-half mile of fixed-rail 
transit stations or within one-quarter mile of major bus stops.  The fund manager, the 
Low-Income Investment Fund (LIIF), is responsible for making sure that the funds are 
distributed across the City.  The funds targets properties whose tenants earning or less 
than 60 percent AMI for rental units and at or less than 95 percent AMI for ownership 
units (at the household level). 
Target property types:  
o Existing federally-assisted rental properties;  
o Existing unsubsidized, below-market rate rental properties; 
o Vacant or commercial properties to be converted to new affordable housing; 
o Rehab and redevelopment of units.   
Fund Structure 
The Fund is managed by Enterprise Community Partners (who also is a contributor to the 
fund via $2 million in second loss capital and $3 million in senior debt).  Currently, the 
Urban Land Conservancy (ULC) - which is the fund’s initial investor (via 10 percent cash 
contributions to each transaction) and a non-profit organization focused on real estate for the 
community - is the sole borrower of the fund.  They are responsible for property acquisition 
& disposition (agreed upon by the partner developer), as well as establishing partnerships 
with local partners for site redevelopment.  While the fund currently has $15 million 
currently capitalized, it is now evolving towards $30 million in total loan capital.  The rest 
of the contributors can be seen below.   
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Figure 7: Breakdown of the Denver TOD Fund’s Capital Stack 
Position Organization Amount | Rate 
Equity Urban Land Conservancy $1.5 million | 0% 
First Loss City of Denver $2.5 million | 0% 
Second Loss Enterprise Community Partners $1 million | 2% 
Third Loss MacArthur Foundation $2 million | PRI 2% 
Third Loss Colorado Housing & Finance Agency $2 million | 2% 
Third Loss Rose Community Foundation $500,000 | 2% 
Forth Loss 
(Senior Debt) 
Enterprise Community Loan Fund  
(with Wells Fargo and US Bank) $5 million | 5% 
Forth Loss 
(Senior Debt) Mile High Community Loan Fund $500,000 | 4% 
 TOTAL $ 15  Million | 3.5% 
 
The lenders have committed for 10 years, with sub-loans being made to ULC anywhere 
from 3-5 years at up to 90 percent loan-to-value.  For the first 5 years, the funds will 
revolve.  After the fifth year, the lenders will be principal repayments in order of seniority.  
It is expected that the capital will take three years to be deployed with 75 percent remaining 
deployed after five years.27  
Products and Terms 
The Denver TOD Fund is unique in the fact that it is a revolving fund with only one eligible 
borrower: the Urban Land Conservancy.  ULC targets three types of properties: existing 
federally-assisted rental properties; unsubsidized rental properties that are currently 
affordable for 60 percent area median income population; and vacant or commercial 
properties with desirable locations for the development of new affordable housing.  
Eligible activities include acquisition, holding costs, and predevelopment costs. The Fund 
allows ULC to control property through acquisition (up to 5 years) before either partnering 
with or selling the property to another community-minded development entity, who will 
ensure the long-term affordability of rent and / or ownership units. Having this long-term 
entity identified at the beginning is not the time of approval and closing. Efforts to preserve 
the sites in perpetuity will be made through land leases where possible. ULC has the ability 
to serve as master developer when appropriate. 
The Fund also sets thresholds for ULC: they must maintain a debt-to-equity ratio not more 
than 3:1, a minimum equity balance of the greater of 93 percent of the outstanding balance 
                                                 
27 Schmidt, Deidre.  For the Family Housing Fund (Minneapolis). Strategic Acquisition Fund for TOD –
Understanding the National Experience, Exploring the Needs and Opportunities in the Twin Cities Region. 2011. 
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or $10m, and a liquid investment balance equal to, or greater than, one year’s interest on 
operating properties (those with a) 1.1 debt, and 2 years interest reserve on non-income 
generating properties.28 
Ultimately, the Fund lends at 90 percent LTV with a 3.5 percent interest rate. 
Oversight:  The ULC is responsible for identifying desirable properties to acquisition as 
well as finding the take-out developer or long-term owner (who would acquire the 
property after the five year window is up). Enterprise Community Partners is responsible 
for underwriting the individual transactions according to details of the fund that were 
negotiated with the Fund’s investors.  They are also responsible for monitoring ULC’s 
compliance with the equity requirements noted in the previous section.  Lastly, Enterprise 
– rather than the investors - is responsible for loan review and approval.  The intent is to 
keep ULC unburdened and able to react to market conditions.29 
Activity to Date 
(Denver TOD Fund Activity Website Link)  
To date, the Mile High TOD Fund has enabled ULC to acquire six properties; two of which 
are preservation projects and four are vacant parcels.  These 6 projects total approximately 
$8.8m which is about 60 percent of the total fund.  One of the developments has now 
received a tax credit allocation which will trigger a permanent take out of ULC and the 
Fund, and other sub-loan is expected to be partially repaid via a sale of a portion of a 
property to the City of Denver for construction of a new library.  
To date, the Mile High TOD Fund has enabled ULC to close on 5 properties; two of which 
are preservation projects and three are vacant parcels – with an additional vacant property 
currently under contract, scheduled to close in November 2011. One of the developments 
has now received a tax credit allocation which will trigger a permanent take out of ULC and 
the Fund, and other sub-loan is expected to be partially repaid via a sale of a portion of a 
property to the City of Denver for construction of a new library.  
Project: Dahlia Apartments 
Location: 33rd & Dahlia, Denver, CO 
Housing Units: (36) 2-bedroom 
apartments 
Financing:  
o A $450,000 HUD Neighborhood 
Stabilization Funds (NSP) offered 
leverage.   
o Enterprise Community Loan Fund, 
provided a Total Acquisition and Rehab: $1.75 million  
                                                 
28 Schmidt, Deidre.  For the Family Housing Fund (Minneapolis). Strategic Acquisition Fund for TOD –
Understanding the National Experience, Exploring the Needs and Opportunities in the Twin Cities Region. 2011. 
29 IBID   
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This property was the first to utilize financing through the TOD Fund. In December of 
2009, ULC acquired this Northeast Park Hill property located at 33rd & Dahlia – one 
block north of Martin Luther King Blvd. It was foreclosed upon in 2008 qualifying it for 
the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. The property consists of six buildings with a 
total of 36, 2-bedroom family apartment homes and serves over 100 residents. The Dahlia 
Apartments provides 4 permanent jobs. To date, $320,000 has been expended on 
improvements to Dahlia, primarily focused on needed health and safety repairs, roofs, 
drainage, landscaping, and environmental remediation. This work has created more than 
25 project related jobs for contractors. 
Project: Land Purchased at I-25 and Yale Light Rail Station 
Location: 33rd & Dahlia, Denver, CO 
Total Project Costs: $10 million (Total 
redevelopment investment) 
The TOD Fund was used to purchase this 1.2 acre 
piece of land adjacent the existing light rail station 
at I-25 and Yale for $1,325,000. In an innovative 
step, the Regional Transportation District (RTD) 
voted unanimously to execute an agreement 
between RTD and Yale TOD Partners (2 private 
developers) to create a Transit-Oriented Master Plan for the Yale Station area. This site 
includes parcels of land owned by the Partners: Urban Land Conservancy, Koelbel and 
Company and Mile High Development. The Master Plan process will involve area 
evaluation including the engagement of property owners in the vicinity. ULC will work 
with the Yale TOD Partners to create a framework for the future development of the RTD 
owned property, the property owned by the Partners and potentially additional properties 
in the vicinity. This is an ideal site to develop into a mixed use, transit-oriented 
community supportive of RTD’s TOD policy and the growth of light rail ridership. ULC 
plans to develop 100 workforce homes on the site and up to 30,000 square feet of 
commercial space creating 100 jobs during the development of the site and 35 permanent 
jobs once the construction is complete.  
Project: Villa TOD 
Location: 5 Blocks from the 10th & Osage Light Rail Station 
Total Project Costs: $2.3 million (for Acquisition and 
Redevelopment) 
This 0.31 acre mixed use property purchased in August, 2011 
for $1,350,000 is located in the Santa Fe arts district and 
includes 16 units of workforce housing and 7,400 square feet 
of commercial space. ULC plans to partner with NEWSED in 
the short term to manage the necessary rehabilitation work, 
and Denver Inner City Parish who will provide housing 
services programs for the long term take out. Villa TOD is on 
the Santa Fe bus corridor and 5 blocks for the 10th and Osage 
light rail station.   
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Moving Forward 
There are currently plans underway to expand the scope of the TOD Fund beyond the 
existing boundary of the City limits and into the surrounding communities.  Reports have 
estimated the total regional fund around $25 million by 2012 and a goal to generate 1,500 
affordable homes by 2021.30  The Fund is projected to leverage $150 million in investments 
and create more than 2,200 jobs.   
The intent of the expansion is to parallel and accompany the development of the new 
regional light rail transit lines.  While the estimated price tag of $15 in capital that will need 
to be raised is an issue, there are also several other challenges that accompany this 
development.  With the initial fund, it was the City of Denver that provided the initial $2.5 
million in first loss funds.  Now, the neighboring municipalities will need to contribute to 
this top loss portion in order to make it happen.  With this anticipated to be an extremely 
challenging process, Enterprise and the Urban Land Conservancy (who manage and borrow 
from the fund, respectively) are now working alongside the Denver Regional Council of 
Governments (the region’s MPO) to facilitate the process.  The process has been made even 
more difficult due to the fact that the TOD Fund is not considered an eligible use of federal 
transportation dollars, thus requiring all allocated federal funds be swapped with local funds 
if they are to be used. 
There is also discussion of expanding the list of eligible borrowers beyond the ULC.  The 
reason is to expand the purchasing capacity of the Fund.  This will depend on the financing 
and development capacity of these new borrowers.  
                                                 
30 Urban Land Conservancy.  Denver TOD Fund Activity Update – Preserving Affordable Housing Near Transit.  
Greater Boston Working Session on TOD PowerPoint.  2012 
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APPENDIX 5: CASE STUDY: THE MINNEAPOLIS HIAWATHA LAND ACQUISITION LRT 
FUND 
(Hiawatha Land Acquisition LRT Fund Link)  
While Minneapolis has several TOD Land Funds, the Hiawatha Land Assembly Fund, has 
been the most active.  The land assembly grant fund is meant to leverage local and private 
commitments to transit-oriented, pedestrian friendly development to reinforce the 
Metropolitan Council’s investment in light rail transit (LRT).  The original $5 million 
infusion came from Federal Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) Funds.  The 
first $1.2 million in CMAQ funds was allocated to the Metropolitan Council and were used 
to acquire a city project nearby the Downtown East LRT station.  While there was interest 
expressed to continue and expand the financing sources to more projects, when the 
remaining $3.8 million of funds was received and directed towards developer-led projects, 
this conflicted with Federal disposition requirements.   The problem was solved by 
swapping the Federal CMAQ funds with local Hennepin Country funds that would have 
been used for transit operations.   
Currently there is up to $3.5 million available for land assembly projects (involving one or 
more properties/land parcels) for the purpose of creating TOD along the Hiawatha Corridor 
(generally, within 1,500 feet from LRT stations).  Each individual land assembly project’s 
grant request must have a local match of at least 20 percent of the total acquisition price. 
Geography: Target properties (generally within 1,500 feet) of a LRT station along 
Minneapolis’ Hiawatha Corridor. 
Eligible Participants: The cities of Bloomington and Minneapolis, and Hennepin County 
(and their housing and redevelopment authorities, port authority, and economic 
development authorities) are eligible recipients. Neighborhood development 
organizations and private sector developers/partners are not directly eligible for the land 
assembly funds, but could work in partnership with the city or county as a “sub-recipient” 
of these funds.  
Activity to Date 
Project: Currie Park Lofts 
Location: 515 15th Ave. S 
Financing:  
o $1,720,000 in Hiawatha LRT Land Assembly Funds   
o A $400,000 Affordable Housing Trust Fund loan from 
o $341,341 in LCDA Grant from the Metropolitan Council.   
o $370,000 Hennepin County TOD grant.    
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APPENDIX 6: CASE STUDY: MINNEAPOLIS’ THREE OTHER TOD FUNDS 
THE LAND ACQUISITION FOR AFFORDABLE NEW DEVELOPMENT (LAAND) 
PROGRAM 
(LAAND Fund Website Link)  
A collaboratively funded program of Minnesota Housing, the Metropolitan Council and the 
Family Housing Fund (collectively, the “Funders”), that provides loan financing to assist 
communities in  meeting their affordable housing needs by taking advantage of current land 
prices to purchase land to be held for future affordable housing development. The objectives 
of the LAAND Initiative support and are consistent with those of the Corridors of 
Opportunity Initiative. 
Funding for the 2011 LAAND Initiative is provided through resources from the Funders as 
follows: 
o Metropolitan Council - $1,956,500 
o Family Housing Fund - $1,000,000 
o Minnesota Housing - an eligible activity under the Consolidated RFP 
Eligible Uses: (1) Land acquisition; (2) Costs related to acquisition and holding – these 
include appraisals, environmental site assessments, taxes, insurance and site maintenance  
Ineligible Uses: (1) Refinancing the subject property; (2) Reducing land or financing costs 
for development in progress; (3) Other pre-development costs such as platting, interest, 
demolition or soil correction; (4) Holding costs paid by the recipient that are greater than 
five percent of the loan award. 
Funding Requirements: 
o LAAND funds can only be used to acquire sites for affordable housing that are 
consistent with the community’s future affordable housing needs and the stated 
strategic growth goals. 
o Land costs in the area of the proposed project must be an impediment to affordable 
housing development. 
o Projects constructed on land acquired through the loan program shall have a 
minimum of 20 percent of housing units developed for affordable units. Units shall be 
affordable to households earning 60 percent of area median income (AMI) in the 
Metro area and 80 percent of AMI in Greater Minnesota. 
o A seven (7) year minimum period of affordability is required for homeownership 
units. The affordability term for rental housing projects will be a minimum of fifteen 
(15) year affordability. Highest priority will be given to applicants who require the 
longest term of affordability of the units. 
Loan Repayment Terms 
o Land must be purchased within two years of the LAAND funding commitment. 
Development of the land for affordable housing may not commence within one year 
of execution of the loan agreement, but must commence within five years of 
execution of the loan agreement. 
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o A Phase I Environmental Site Assessment will be required before the loan is 
disbursed to purchase the land. 
Activity to Date:  The Fund has yet to make a loan 
THE CAPITAL ACQUISITION REVOLVING FUND (CARF)  
(CARF Website Link)  
Created in 2006 by the Minneapolis City Council, the Capital Acquisition Revolving Fund 
targets the acquisition of property or financing of property acquisition for redevelopment of 
sites located on commercial and transit corridors and at commercial nodes (designated in 
The Minneapolis Plan) for mixed commercial and residential use. Funds will be used to 
assemble or aid in assembly of larger sites for development of new commercial buildings, 
mixed residential and commercial buildings and mixed-income rental and ownership 
multifamily housing. At least 20 percent of the housing units must be affordable at <50 
percent MMI (city affordable housing policy).  Though it is meant to be used by either the 
city or a private developer some strategic acquisitions, to date it has only been used by the 
city for acquisition purposes.  
Eligible Uses: Redevelopment for either commercial use or mixed commercial and 
residential use that is: (1) Located on a commercial corridor or at a commercial node 
designated in The Minneapolis Plan; or (2) Located on a major transit corridor.  
Eligible Costs: Acquisition, relocation, demolition, property holding management costs, 
gap financing for private acquisition and assembly.  
The Fund has about $1 million and the lending interest rate depends on the associated risk of 
the project.  It has a short-term (3-5 years), so it would need to be the "right type of projects" 
for it to make sense.   
Activity to Date:  The Fund has yet to make a loan 
GREAT STREETS REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT GAP FINANCING PROGRAM 
(Great Streets Program Website Link)  
The Gap Financing Program provides loans for catalytic commercial projects where 
investment will likely spur additional development. Projects must be located in areas 
designated as Great Streets eligible areas: commercial corridors, commercial nodes, activity 
centers and LRT station areas designated in The Minneapolis Plan for Sustainable Growth. 
To date the program has mainly supported neighborhood business districts.  Projects have 
one or more public benefits including job creation, blight removal, tax base enhancement, 
etc.  The typical loan size is $150,000 - $450,000 and all loan rates thus far have been below 
market (see Loan Terms for more info).  This financing is typically the most at-risk in a 
project because the Gap Financing Programs usually assumes a subordinated (i.e. 2nd-3rd) 
mortgage.  If there is funding participation by a government entity (i.e. a county funding 
source), there may be some ability to negotiate where they are in the stack, but in general the 
public sector will always have the most risk.  The program generally tries to add some 
security, by getting a personal guarantee from the developer.   
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In the past the program was financed by local money and CDBG grants but due to cut-
backs, it is now just CDBG funds.   The program currently has $1.5 million and makes loans 
from $150,000-$450,000 depending on projects size and needs.  One person involved with 
the program commented that because CDBG funds are federal funding source, there are lots 
of requirements that go along with it.  "It is not the certainly not the easiest money in the 
world to use, but it can certainly close a gap in a project."  Since is a relatively new program 
having begun in 2010, it has only made about 10 loans.   
Activity to Date 
The Gap Financing Program has funded 11 projects to date; a sample is below.  Please see 
Appendix 8 for a complete breakdown of the project financing to date. 
2823 East Franklin Avenue Seward Coop 
            
                               Before                                                                     After 
This project consisted of the expansion and relocation of the Seward Co-op to the east end 
of Franklin Avenue.  It replaced the run-down, vacant buildings with a colorful, sustainable 
structure that serves the community with healthy food, a community gathering space, and 
nutrition classes. The co-op secured $656,000 in public funding and $9,768,620 in private 
financing, over $1 million of which was in the form of member loans. The Great Streets 
Program was involved with a $150,000 loan and the project was completed in January of 
2009. 
 
See Links for Other Similar Projects: 
o Seward Coop 
o 1200 West Broadway/Kindred Kitchen 
o African Development Center 
o Chicago Avenue Fire Arts Center 
o Five Points 
o Master Engineering 
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APPENDIX 7: MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA’S FOUR LAND ACQUISITION FUNDS 
Source:  Reconnecting America’s Center for Transit-Oriented Development.  San Francisco Bay Area Property Acquisition Fund for Equitable Transit-Oriented 
Development – Feasibility Assessment Report.  Oakland, CA. January 2010.  Pg. 23. 
Fund & Location Goal 
Initiation 
Date & 
Origin of 
Fund 
Fund 
Type & 
Size 
Fund 
Manager 
Capital 
Stack/ First 
Loss Position 
Affordability or Other 
Key Project 
Requirements 
Terms 
Number 
of Loans 
Made 
Hiawatha LRT 
Land Assembly, 
Minneapolis, MN 
Financing for mixed-use, 
pedestrian and TOD projects 
located near Hiawatha LRT 
transit stations. 
In 2005, the 
City of 
Minneapolis 
issued an 
RFP 
requesting 
for land 
acquisition 
proposals 
Grant 
Fund; $5 
million 
Minneapolis 
Metropolitan 
Council 
N/A Either: 20% of units must 
be affordable (<50% 
MMI). legal commitment 
to build affordable units 
elsewhere in the City, or 
$80,000 per un-built 
affordable unit. 15-year 
affordability restriction. 
One time grant 3 grants 
Capital 
Acquisition 
Revolving Fund, 
Minneapolis, MN 
Land acquisition financing for 
commercial, mixed-income, 
rental and multifamily 
homeownership properties in 
commercial and transit corridors 
In 2006; 
created by 
the 
Minneapolis 
City Council 
Revolving 
Loan 
Fund; $1 
million 
City 
Community 
Planning and 
Econ Dev. 
Dept. 
Top Loss: 
City of 
Minneapolis 
At least 20% of housing 
units at <50% Metro 
Median Income (MMI) 
N/A 0 
Land Acquisition 
for Affordable 
New 
Development, 
Minneapolis, MN 
Land acquisition financing for 
affordable housing projects. 
In 2007, 
established 
by the 
Metropolitan 
Council 
Revolving 
Loan 
Fund; $4 
million 
Minneapolis 
Metropolitan 
Council 
Minnesota 
Housing, the 
Metropolitan 
Council, 
Family 
Housing Fund 
20% of units at 60% AMI 
in the Metro area and 
80% of AMI in Greater 
Minnesota; 7-year 
affordability restriction 
for homeownership 
projects. 
Construction 
between Year 1 to 
Year 5; Repayment 
based on appraised 
value of the site at 
the time of 
repayment 
0 
Great Streets 
Real Estate 
Development Gap 
Financing 
Program,  
Minneapolis, MN 
For real estate development and 
development acquisition for 
transformative commercial 
development projects located on 
designated commercial corridors, 
nodes, and LRT station areas. 
May 2010  City 
Community 
Planning and 
Econ Dev. 
Dept. 
N/A  1% origination fee.  
The typical loan 
size is $150,000 - 
$450,000. 
10 
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APPENDIX 8: GREAT STREETS GAP FINANCING LOAN TERMS BY PROJECT* 
Interest Rate Period Payments
Interest 
Rate
Amortization 
Period
Balloon
Seward Co-op 1/1/2008 Support $150,000 $9,800,000 $9,650,000 4.00% 2 yrs interest-only 4.00% 10 yrs at year 7 Wrapped up in NMTC 75 85 157
Chicago Avenue Fire Arts Center 6/2/2009 Intervene $425,000 $1,000,000 $575,000 4.00% 2 yrs interest-only 4.00% 30 yrs at year 10 Subordinate mortgage (3rd)  w/2% in 2nd 
position 
3 0 16
Longfellow Station Early 2010 Support $300,000 $30,800,000 $30,500,000 0.00% 2 yrs no payments 4.00% 13 yrs Subordinate mortgage on property (2nd) 95 0 493
The Greenleaf 9/3/2010 Monitor $245,000 $1,678,084 $1,433,084 4.00% 2 yrs interest-only 4.00% 20 yrs at year 7
Subordinate mortgage (3rd)  w/2% in 2nd 
position 7 0 27
African Development Center 
(North Country Coop) 3/31/2009 Intervene $200,000 $11,650,000 $965,000 4.00% 4 yrs interest-only 4 or adj% 3 at year 7
Subordinate mortgage (3rd)  w/2% in 2nd 
position 4 7 19
Catalyst Community Partners 
(1200 W Broadway/Commercial Kitchen)
5/22/2009 Intervene $450,000 $2,032,831 $1,582,831 3.25% 2 yrs interest-only 3.25% 20 yrs at year 10 Personal guaranty; upon satisfaction of NAF 
loan the City will take a second mortgage 
80 0 33
Delisi/Five Points 9/16/2009 Intervene $450,000 $2,650,000 $2,200,000 3.25% 2 yrs interest-only 3.25% 25 yrs at  year 10
Surbodinate mortgage on property (2nd) and 
personal guaranty 32 25 42
Bystrom (Phase I - Touchstone) 6/2/2009 Support
$103,000, with 2nd 
advance up to 
$497,000 on sale of 
City parcel  = 
$600,000
$4,900,000 $4,300,000 0.00%
42 months after 
City obtains 
ROW for East 
22nd Street
deferred, loan to 
be repaid 
primarily from 
land sale 
proceeds
4.00% 10 yrs at year 10 Subordinate mortgage 32 27 78
Master Engineering (Irv's Bar) 4/23/2007 Intervene $350,000 $1,073,400 $723,400 4.00% 4yrs interest-only 4.00% 6 yrs at year 10 Subordinate Mortgage 14 10 17
Juxtaposition Arts 3/9/2007 Intervene $165,000 ($82,500 can 
be forgiven)
$700,000 $535,000 4.00% 20 yrs principal and 
interest
Subordinate mortgage on the real esate (4th), 
FFE and assignment of leases and rents.
3 5 11
Emerge (North Branch Library) 6/10/2007 Intervene $350,000 $55,799,315 $55,449,315 4.00% 2 yrs interest only 4.00% 15  yrs 
Mortgage on real estate (3rd) - not yet closed 
borrower must have all funds in place to cover 
project costs prior to closing  
345 0 893
Total Real Estate Development $3,685,000 $109,920,546 $107,913,630 682 159 1786
*Jobs Created and Retained include both Part and Full time (not converted to FTE's). These are estimates only.
**Expected to close when project is fully funded (early 2012)
Leverage = Total Project Cost - City Investment
Loan Amount
1st Period 2nd Period
Security (Position)Total Project Cost Leverage Jobs 
Created
Jobs 
Retained*
Construction 
Jobs
Area 
Cateogry
Date
 
* N.B. This chart is about 5 months old and in the interim, three or four of the projects have become no longer viable. 
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APPENDIX 9: TOD & AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY, FINANCING & FUNDING TOOLS, FAIRMOUNT INDIGO LINE, BOSTON, MA.   
Tool 
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Description Example 
TOD Planning 
Manager 
City, Transit 
agency 
City, Transit 
Agency     X 
An employee funded by the Office of 
Commonwealth Development and the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) to serve as TOD 
planning manager. An intermediary 
between the private sector, City, State and 
Transit Agency. Works with private 
developers to understand their needs and 
address their concerns. Provides education 
about TOD and helps developers find 
funding sources. 
Tad Read 
Linkage 
Program 
City, 
Developer 
CDCs, 
Developer  X X X  
The linkage program is meant to balance 
large-scale commercial development with 
needed residential construction. Linkage is 
a fee ($7.87 per square foot for housing 
programs and $1.57 for jobs programs) 
exacted from all new large-scale 
commercial real estate development 
exceeding 100,000 square feet. The linkage 
requirement can be fulfilled with a cash 
payment or through direct creation of 
housing or a job-training program. The 
housing is to be built within a mile and a 
half of the commercial development that 
generated the funds. 
Dudley Village Housing Project 
is a mixed-use development 
containing 50 new affordable 
rental housing units, 7,700 square 
feet of commercial space, a 
computer center for the residents, 
outdoor play space, and bicycle 
storage. Linkage fees were used 
to build the affordable units. 
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Description Example 
Chapter 40R: 
Smart Growth 
Incentive 
Zoning 
State Municipality  X X X X 
Passed into law in 2004, it provides for 
direct payments to municipalities that adopt 
smart growth overlay zoning districts in 
downtowns, commercial centers, and 
around transit stations and issue building 
permits in these areas to create new 
opportunities for housing. The Zoning 
Incentive Payment is based on the number 
of net additional housing units allowed by 
newly adopted zoning. Density bonus 
payments are tied to the issuance of 
building permits for new housing units. A 
payment of $3,000 is made to the 
municipality for each new unit that is 
permitted. 
On May 20, 2006, the Town of 
Plymouth approved at Town 
Meeting a Chapter 40R District 
for Cordage Park, which will 
allow for the development of 675 
units of housing, 50,000 square 
feet of retail, and 600,000 square 
feet of office uses next to 
Plymouth Station on the 
Plymouth/Kingston Commuter 
Rail Line. 
Chapter 40B: 
Comprehensive 
Permit Law 
State / Local 
Government Developer X  X   
Encourages the development of affordable 
housing in communities that currently lack 
economic diversity. Allows developers to 
apply for expedited permit review process. 
Allows an appeal of a local government 
decision about permits. Allows developers 
to build affordable housing at greater 
densities than is allowed under local 
zoning.  To qualify, generally the 
affordable homes in a development must 
have >=25% of units affordable to low- and 
moderate-income hhds 
From 2002-2006, 30% of all new 
housing construction in the state 
and 80% of all low and moderate 
income housing outside of larger 
cities was built under 40B. 
Construction of 30,000 
affordable units over the past 35 
years 
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Description Example 
Chapter 40S: 
School Cost 
Insurance 
Policy 
State Municipalities X X    
Designed to cover the unfunded costs of 
educating any school-age children who 
move into Chapter 40R Smart Growth 
Zoning districts. Qualifying communities 
will be reimbursed for the net cost of 
educating students living in new housing in 
smart growth districts 
No funding for schools from 40S 
yet 
Chapter 90E State DOT X    X 
"The [transportation] commissioner shall 
make all reasonable provisions for the 
accommodation of bicycle and pedestrian 
traffic in the planning, design, and 
construction, reconstruction or maintenance 
of any project undertaken by the 
department." 
Resulted in a new statewide 
"Project Development Guide", 
which takes a "complete streets" 
approach to street design, with 
attention paid to pedestrians, 
cyclists and transit-users. 
Commercial 
Area Transit 
Node Housing 
Program 
(CATNHP) 
State 
Municipality, 
CDC and 
developer  
X X X X 
Bond program to support first-time 
homebuyer housing through new 
construction or acquisition and 
rehabilitation. Only residential projects, 25 
units or more, within neighborhood 
commercial areas and in proximity to 
public transit nodes. At least 51% of the 
units in the project must be affordable. 
Developers used CATNHP funds 
for the Ashmont TOD, a mixed-
use development including 116 
new housing units, 74 affordable 
rental units, 42 market rate for-
sale condominiums, and 10,000 
sq ft of retail space. 
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Description Example 
Smart Growth 
Technical 
Assistance 
State 
Developer, 
Municipality, 
Community 
Organization 
  X X X 
The TOD Planning Manager at the Office 
of Commonwealth Development provides 
technical assistance for local communities 
to facilitate access to State resources, such 
as the Priority Development Fund, the 
Chapter 40R, and surplus MBTA Property 
to help catalyze TOD. 
In the City of Attleboro, the 
Technical Assistance Grant is 
being used for planning, urban 
design, financial feasibility 
analyses, and traffic studies for 
26 acres of land between Ten 
Mile River and the downtown 
Attleboro Commuter Rail station 
to allow for 300 to 500 housing 
units as well as 35,000 square 
feet of retail development. 
TOD 
Infrastructure 
& Housing 
Support 
Program (TOD 
Bond Program) 
State Developer  X X X X 
Multi-year funding to finance pedestrian 
improvements, bicycle facilities, housing 
projects, and parking facilities in mixed use 
developments located within 1/2 mile of a 
transit station. The TOD Bond Program is 
designed so that projects located in an 
existing or proposed Chapter 40R Smart 
Growth Overlay District receive more 
points in the scoring system. At least 25% 
of the units in housing projects must be 
affordable to households earning up to 80% 
of the area median income. 
Dudley Village Housing Project 
is a mixed-use development 
containing 50 new affordable 
rental housing units, 7,700 square 
feet of commercial space, a 
computer center for the residents, 
outdoor play space, and bicycle 
storage. 
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Description Example 
Massachusetts 
Affordable 
Housing Trust 
Fund 
State / Local 
Government Developer  X X X  
A flexible funding source that can be used 
to produce and preserve rental and 
ownership units for households with 
incomes of up to 110% of the area median 
income, adjusted for household size. It can 
also be used to provide down payment 
assistance for homeownership. 
The Affordable Housing Trust 
Fund has provided funding for 
5,527 units of housing, 4,542 of 
which qualify as affordable. 
Twenty-four percent of the units 
serve families and individuals 
with extremely low incomes, 
those who make less than 30% of 
the area median. 
Priority 
Development 
Fund: Capital 
Grants and 
Planning 
Assistance 
Grants 
State / Local 
Government 
Developer, 
Municipality, 
CDCs  
X X X X 
$100 million of state funding including $75 
million for mixed-income communities 
throughout the state where at least 20% is 
affordable. $3 million for comprehensive 
planning for communities looking to 
develop affordable housing plans. $22 
million to fund the development of new 
affordable rental housing located near 
transit stations. And grants of up to $50,000 
per project for financial assistance for 
planning, education, outreach, financial 
feasibility analyses and other planning 
activities related to increasing housing 
production through planning and zoning 
changes. 
Cordovan at Haverhill Station, 
involves the conversion of a 
mostly vacant historical property 
into 146 1-and 2-bedroom rental 
units of which 85 are market rate 
and 61 are affordable 
Source:  Reconnecting America’s Center for Transit-Oriented Development.  Realizing the Potential: Expanding Housing Opportunities Near Transit.  Oakland, CA. 
April 2007.  Pg. 62. 
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APPENDIX 10: VARIOUS LENDERS IN BOSTON FOR THE VARIOUS STAGES OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 
Feasibility / Planning Pre-Development Acquisition Construction Mini-Perm Permanent 
• LISC  
• Philanthropy  
• Chapter 40R 
(Smart Growth 
Zoning Act)  
• Cities/Counties  
• LISC  
• CEDAC  
• Cities/Counties  
• Philanthropy  
• Cities/Counties  
• Private Banks  
• Boston Community 
Capital 
• CEDAC 
• Life Initiative 
• Property and 
Casualty Initiative  
• MHIC  
• LISC  
• MassHousing 
• MassHousing  
• Banks  
• MHFA  
• Land Banks 
• Banks  
 
• Banks  
• MassHousing  
• HUD  
• Fannie Mae  
• Freddie Mac  
• Life Insurance/ 
Pension funds  
• Mortgage 
REITs 
48 
 
APPENDIX 11: VARIOUS ACQUISITION AND PRE-DEVELOPMENT LENDERS IN BOSTON (2010) 
Lender / Source Program Description  Comments 
CEDAC* 
Term: 2 years (may be extended);  Rate: 7%; 
LTV: Can be up to 100% (with Home Funders) 
Limited Home Funders money and only for family 
projects. More capital available at standard rates but 
underwriting is tougher. MacArthur preservation 
funding is slightly below market. 
LISC* Term: 2-3 years;  Rate: 5.75% (less for Harvard money); LTV: Up to 90% 
Limited Harvard University funding only in certain 
locations; NY review of loans 
Boston 
Community 
Capital 
Term: 2-3 years;  Rate: 7%;   LTV: 75% 
Recourse and 2nd re-payment source sometimes. 
Much more aware of risks and concerned about 
borrower capacity and take-out financing. 
Life Initiative Term: 2.5 years;  Rate: 6.5%;   LTV: 75%-80% Have been more patient as necessary 
Property and 
Casualty 
Initiative 
Term: 2-3 years;  Rate: 6-7% (not tied to index, tries to be 
competitive and risk aware);   LTV: 70-75% 
Generally in collaboration with other lenders but 
will do single placements. 
MassHousing 
Term: 2-3 years;   Rate: 6-7% (slightly lower on NSLF); 
LTV: Depends on deal and cash flow 
Still open for business and has capital. Notes that 
occupied properties a plus for carrying costs: lease 
or strong business plan for commercial properties. 
Conventional 
Banks 
Term: Varies; tend to be shorter;   Rate: 3% (Citizens, no 
longer available)-others prime or LIBOR-based rate;   
LTV: Varies; lower usually than quasi’s and intermediaries 
More risk averse especially now. 
City/BRA 
Term: Frequently turned into grant;   Rate: 0%; 
LTV: Usually only a portion of loan 
No longer available; program lacked transparency 
of allocation process 
* Only CEDAC & LISC provide both Pre-Development and Acquisition Funding; all others provide only acquisition.   
Source: The 2010 Report by LISC Consultant Charleen Ragen: TOD Acquisition Fund Feasibility Update, May 11th, 2010.  
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APPENDIX 12: FINANCING TOOLS AVAILABLE FOR THE ACQUISITION, HOLD, AND PREPARATION OF LAND FOR TOD IN BOSTON 
** Note: this list below includes only sources that are available to secure site control or acquire property as opposed to permanent sources that include acquisition as an 
eligible cost. 
Source Program Description 
Relation to TOD and 
Focus on Land 
Acquisition 
Eligibility Notes 
Neighborhood 
Stabilization 
Funds  (HUD) 
A component of the CDBG, 
the program is focused on 
the stabilization of 
communities that have 
suffered from foreclosures 
and abandonment.  
Generally the grant money 
must be used to buy, fix up, 
and resell foreclosed and 
abandoned homes.  USE: 
Affordable Housing, Land 
Acquisition.   
Focus on Land Acquisition: 
NSP Funds can be used to 
establish a land bank for 
foreclosed homes & 
properties.  There is a 10-
year limit on land banking 
and property end-use must 
be consistent with program 
requirements).                   
 Using new funds from this 
program as well as its own funds, 
the City will be offering up to 
$15,000 in financial assistance to 
homebuyers purchasing real 
estate owned (REO) properties 
(i.e. bank-owned foreclosed 
properties) in high-foreclosure 
areas, and will also provide up to 
$50,000 in renovation assistance 
to these buyers.  
Priority 
Development 
Fund 
(DHCD) 
The Priority Development 
Fund (PDF) was created in 
2004 by MassHousing to 
provide funding to assist 
communities identify and 
implement strategies to 
increase the production of 
affordable housing, both 
rental and homeownership.  
The goal of the PDF 
Planning Assistance funding 
is to increase the supply of 
affordable housing in the 
Commonwealth by 
encouraging community-
based planning that will lead 
directly to affordable 
housing production.   
 
Focus on Land Acquisition: 
PDF Funds can be used for 
gaining site control, site 
analysis, financial 
feasibility analysis, 
preliminary architectural 
and engineering studies, 
and legal review. 
Eligible Applicants: Consist of cities and 
towns within the Commonwealth.  
Municipalities may enter into third party 
agreements with consultants approved by 
DHCD, however only a municipality will 
be allowed to enter into a contract with 
MassHousing regarding the distribution 
of funds.   
 
Eligible Activities: Activities associated 
with the production of affordable housing 
in municipally owned/controlled sites, 
including: Gaining site control, site 
analysis, financial feasibility analysis, 
preliminary architectural and engineering 
studies, and legal review. 
 
Award Amount: Up to $15,000. 
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Leading the 
Way III 
Program, 
Reclamation 
Efforts, 
Multi-
Property 
Purchases by 
the City31 
The City of Boston’s 
comprehensive three-year 
housing strategy designed to 
increase the production of 
new housing within the city. 
Focus on Land Acquisition: 
With help from Federal 
Neighborhood Stabilization 
Funds (available thru 
HUD), the City will be 
making multi-property 
purchases of Real Estate 
Owned (REO) (i.e. bank 
owned) properties directly 
from the lenders.  The 
properties will then be 
made available to 
homebuyers, contractors, 
developers, and non-profits 
for renovation and re-
occupancy.     
  While this is more directed at 
stabilization and quick 
turnaround, there may be 
opportunity for a joint 
development or public private 
partnership.    
Dudley 
Neighbors, 
Inc. 
Community 
Land Trust 
Run by the  Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative 
(DSNI) (a  Community 
Development Corporation in 
South Boston), the 121A 
Corporation has the power 
of eminent domain to 
acquire privately-owned 
vacant land in the area 
designated as the “Dudley 
Triangle”. 
Focus on TOD: The Dudley 
Triangle includes the land 
around the immediately 
adjacent to the Upham’s 
Corner MBTA stop on the 
Fairmount-Indigo Line. 
  DNI is structured as a 
Community Land Trust (CLT) 
 It is focused on preserving 
affordable housing and 
providing residents with a way 
to control the development 
process in the neighborhood.  
 DNI leases land initially to 
developers during construction, 
and subsequently to individual 
homeowners, cooperative 
housing corporations and other 
forms of limited partnerships.  
Through its 99-year ground 
lease, DNI can require that its 
properties be used for purposes 
set forth by the community. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Department of Neighborhood Development.  Leading the Way III – A Report on Boston’s Housing Strategy for 2009-2012. March 2009.  Pg. 23. 
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APPENDIX 13: PROJECTED BOSTON TOD FUND PRI AND CDFI-ORIGINATING LENDERS 
PRI LENDERS:  
 Hyams Foundation,  
 Boston Foundation  
 Other local or national foundations  
 
POSSIBLE CDFI-ORIGINATING LENDERS:   
 Boston Community Capital (BCC) – a CDFI who provides a wide range of debt and equity products for low-income communities 
and individuals and for emerging businesses and entrepreneurs.   
 Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation (CEDAC) - a public-private, CDFI that provides technical assistance, 
pre-development lending, and consulting services to non-profit organizations involved in housing development, workforce 
development, neighborhood economic development, and capital improvements to child care facilities.  
 Life Initiative – a $100 million dollar community investment fund created by life insurance companies in order to support 
affordable housing developments, commercial properties, businesses and community facilities in low and moderate income 
communities and households.   
 Property and Casualty Initiative (PCI) – a state wide community loan fund created specifically to promote economic development 
by providing loans that improve the health and welfare of low income residents and communities across the Commonwealth. 
 Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) – Provides funding, financing, and technical assistance to Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs), Non-Profit Developers, and Policy & Advocacy Organizations in Greater Boston. 
 Mass Housing Investment Corporation (MHIC) - a private lender and investor specializing in the financing of affordable housing 
and community development throughout Massachusetts & New England.  
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APPENDIX 14: ACQUISITION AND PRE-DEVELOPMENT SOURCES FOR PROJECTS ALONG THE FAIRMOUNT CORRIDOR 
Project Name CDC Project Type TOTAL Project 
Acquisition Budget
Pre-
Development 
Budget
CEDAC LISC Boston Comm. 
Capital
MHIC Life 
Initiative
DBEDC- 
CDFI
Seller 
Financing
New 
TOD 
Fund
Sponsor/ 
Developer
Mass. 
Dvlpmt 
Brownfields
EPA Boston 
Foundation
Kresge 
Foundation
Enterprise Citizens Bank Boston 
DND
Corp. for 
Supportive 
Housing
TOTAL % 
COMMITTED
ACQUISITION
Project I DB Commercial $1,190,000 $1,190,000 $260,000 $100,000 $650,000 $200,000 $1,210,000 102%
Project II DB Commercial $1,075,000 $499,000 $499,000 $499,000 100%
Project III DB Commercial $1,775,000 $0 $0
Project IV DB Residential $5,890,810 $137,095 $137,095 $0 $137,095 100%
Project V CS Mixed $1,847,501 $1,847,501 $616,500 $386,000 $845,000 $1,847,500 100%
Project VI CS Mixed $44,500 $0 $0
Project VII CS Residential $50,000 $0 $0
Project VIII CS Mixed $1,593,704 $1,593,704 $1,434,334 $1,434,334 90%
Project IX SW Residential $910,000 $910,000 $910,000 $0 $910,000 100%
Project X MCDC Mixed $320,000 $0 $0
Project XI MCDC Residential $1,853,773 $0 $0
TOTAL $16,550,288 $6,177,300 $910,000 $1,831,429 $0 $499,000 $616,500 $100,000 $650,000 $0 $586,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $845,000 $0 $0 $6,037,929 98%
PREDEVELOPMENT
Project I DB Commercial $650,000 $7,500 $0 $0 $0 $250,000 $0 $0 $37,500 $51,500 $60,000 $0 $406,500 63%
Project II DB Commercial $300,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $200,000 $0 $200,000 67%
Project III DB Commercial $425,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $75,000 $25,000 $75,000 $50,000 $225,000 53%
Project IV DB Residential $2,225,601 $700,000 $707,905 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $47,000 $53,000 $0 $250,000 $1,757,905 79%
Project V CS Mixed $700,000 $253,000 $130,000 $117,000 $500,000 71%
Project VI CS Mixed $375,000 $0 0%
Project VII CS Residential $300,000 $0 0%
Project VIII CS Mixed $400,000 $400,000 $400,000 100%
Project IX SW Residential $550,000 $400,000 $150,000 $550,000 100%
Project X MCDC Mixed $798,770 $60,000 $66,000 $50,000 $176,000 22%
Project XI MCDC Residential $125,330 $125,000 $125,000 100%
$6,849,701 $1,820,500 $987,905 $0 $0 $0 $250,000 $0 $0 $276,500 $170,500 $285,000 $75,000 $50,000 $250,000 $0 $125,000 $50,000 $4,340,405 63%
TOTAL ACQUISITON & PREDEVELOPMENT $13,027,001 $2,730,500 $2,819,334 $0 $499,000 $616,500 $350,000 $650,000 $0 $862,500 $170,500 $285,000 $75,000 $50,000 $250,000 $845,000 $125,000 $50,000 $10,378,334 80%
$139,371
$10,512,359
$2,509,296
$2,648,667
$3,511,167
$13,884,155
TOTAL ACQUISITON NEED
TOTAL ACQUISITON+PRE-DEVLMT NEED
POTENTIAL ACQUISITON NEED*
TOTAL PRE-DEVELOPMNET NEED
TOTAL
TOTAL ACQ + PRE-DEVMPT NEED (EXCLUDING SPONORS LOANs)
POTENTIAL COMBINED ACQ AND PRE-DEV NEEDS
COMMITTED OR PENDING
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APPENDIX 15: MATRIX OF EXISTING MISSION-DRIVEN PROPERTY ACQUISITION FUNDS AROUND THE U.S. (2007) 
Fund & 
Location Goal 
Initiation 
Date & 
Origin of 
Fund 
Fund Type & 
Size 
Fund 
Manager 
Capital 
Stack/ First 
Loss Position 
Affordability or 
Other Key Project 
Requirements 
Terms 
Number 
of Loans 
Made 
Lessons/ 
Complexities 
Western States 
Lower San 
Antonio 
Community 
Development 
Fund, 
Oakland, CA 
Pre-
development 
and land 
acquisition 
financing for 
affordable 
housing 
In 2005; 
initiated by 
the Annie E. 
Casey 
Foundation 
and Evelyn & 
Walter Haas, 
Jr. Fund. 
Loan fund; $8 
million 
Northern 
California 
Community 
Loan Fund 
Loss reserve 
given by the 
Evelyn & 
Walter Haas, Jr. 
Fund. 
Borrowers are 
individually pre-
approved and 
underwritten. 
Max. loan term: 3 
years; max. loan 
amount: $1.5 mil per 
project ($3 mil per 
borrower); loan-to-
value (LTV): 100%; 
Interest rate: 5.5%; 
loan loss reserve: 5% 
Two; One 
pending 
Omitting private 
bank Involvement 
protects the fund 
from regulatory 
requirements for 
private lenders. 
LA County 
Housing 
Innovation 
Fund, LLC, 
Los Angeles, 
CA 
Pre-
development 
and land 
acquisition 
financing for 
supportive 
affordable 
housing 
projects. 
In 2007; 
invested in by 
the Los 
Angeles 
County Board 
of Supervisors 
Revolving Loan 
Fund; $60 
million 
Corporation of 
Supportive 
Housing and 
Wells Fargo 
Top loss: L.A. 
County (33%); 
Second loss: 
CDFIs 
(13%each); 
Senior lenders 
(53%) 
N/A Max. loan term: 5 
years; max. loan 
amount: $500k; 
LTV: 100%; Interest 
rate: stuck 
N/A N/A 
New 
Generation 
Fund, Los 
Angeles, CA 
Pre-
development 
and land 
acquisition 
financing for 
affordable 
rental or 
homeownership 
housing. 
In 2008; 
initiated by 
the City of 
Los Angeles 
and Enterprise 
Community 
Partners. 
Loan fund; $150 
million 
Forsyth Street 
Advisors 
By project, Top 
loss: City of Los 
Angeles ($10 
Million 
guarantee fund 
outside of 
transactions); 
equity: 
borrowers (5%) 
N/A Max. loan term: 3 
years; Max. loan 
amount: $10 million; 
Interest rate: 30-day 
variable rate or 12 
month fixed rate; 
Max. LTV: 130% 
(non-profit 
borrowers) or up to 
95% (for-profit 
borrowers) 
Two ($5.85 
million and 
$9.55 
million) 
N/A 
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Fund & 
Location Goal 
Initiation 
Date & 
Origin of 
Fund 
Fund Type & 
Size 
Fund 
Manager 
Capital 
Stack/ First 
Loss Position 
Affordability or 
Other Key Project 
Requirements 
Terms 
Number 
of Loans 
Made 
Lessons/ 
Complexities 
Metro TOD 
& Centers 
Program, 
Portland, OR. 
Land 
acquisition and 
holding for 
housing and 
mixed-use 
developments in 
transit corridors 
and commercial 
nodes 
In 1998; 
established by 
FTA funding 
Direct 
Acquisition; $5 
million every 
two years 
The Metro, 
using Metro 
Transportation 
Improvement 
Funds 
N/A N/A N/A 11 projects 
funded 
  
Washington 
State Land 
Acquisition 
Program, WA 
Land 
acquisition 
financing for 
multi- or single- 
family 
affordable 
housing. 
In 2007; 
funds 
appropriated 
by state 
legislature 
Rolling 
Revolving Loan 
Fund; $6 
million 
Washington 
State Housing 
Finance 
Commission 
N/A Target of up to 80% 
AMI; 30 year 
affordability restriction 
Max loan term: 4-8 
year; construction 
between year 4 and 
year 8; Interest rate: 
1%; Repayment: 4-6 
years from proceeds 
of construction 
financing 
N/A N/A 
Rapid 
Response 
Program, WA 
Land 
acquisition 
financing for 
affordable 
housing and 
community 
facilities in 
areas with rapid 
gentrification. 
In 2008, 
WSHFC 
announced the 
creation of the 
new fund. 
Loan Fund; $10 
million 
Washington 
State Housing 
Finance 
Commission 
N/A N/A Priority to: mobile 
home parks facing 
closure; King County 
areas facing 
gentrification or 
redevelopment; City 
of Spokane areas 
facing displacement 
due to loss of 
affordable units 
N/A N/A 
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Fund & 
Location Goal 
Initiation 
Date & 
Origin of 
Fund 
Fund Type & 
Size 
Fund 
Manager 
Capital 
Stack/ First 
Loss Position 
Affordability or 
Other Key Project 
Requirements 
Terms 
Number 
of Loans 
Made 
Lessons/ 
Complexities 
Mid-Western States 
Louisiana 
Loan Fund, 
New Orleans, 
LA 
Pre-
development 
and land 
acquisition 
financing for 
affordable and 
mixed-income 
housing 
affected by 
Hurricanes 
Katrina & Rita 
In April 2007, 
LISC & 
Enterprise 
approached 
the State of 
Louisiana 
Loan fund; $47 
million, $2M 
for 
predevelopment 
2 pools 
administered 
by LISC itself 
& by 
Enterprise 
LLC 
$17M - State of 
Louisiana 
(CDBG) - first 
1/3rd of losses, 
limited to 1/3 of 
each project 
loan 
51% of units at 80% 
area median income, 
majority of funds to 
used in 8 parishes most 
affected by Katrina 
Predevelopment - 
$200,000 at 0% 
interest for 12 mos., 
Acquisition - $3 
million at 5.5% 
interest for 24 mos., 
Loan to Value 100% 
for non-profits & 
95% for for-profits 
N/A State CBGB 
Funding 
complicates and 
limits project 
loans. 
Denver TOD 
Fund, 
Denver, CO 
Property 
acquisition for 
the preservation 
and creation of 
affordable 
housing along 
existing and 
planned transit 
corridors. 
Established in 
2003 and 
staffed in 
2007; run by 
the Urban 
Land 
Conservancy 
(ULC), a 
nonprofit That 
supports the 
Denver 
Community 
Foundation 
Direct 
Acquisition; 
$17 million 
ULC Equity: ULC 
($1.5 mil);  First 
loss: Denver 
($2.5 mil); 
Second loss: 
foundations & 
housing finance 
agency ($4.5 
mil);  Senior 
Debt: Enterprise 
& Mile High 
Community 
Fund ($6.5 mil) 
In 2008, over 80% of 
very low income 
households were 
served; 350 very low 
and extremely low 
income (below 
30%AMI) people 
served. 15% of fund is 
focused on households 
below 30% AMI. 
Interest rate: 2-3%; 
Max. LTV: 100%; 
Equity: $1 mil; when 
possible, uses a 99-
year land lease to 
ensure permanent 
public benefit 
Sole 
Borrower is 
the ULC 
N/A 
Capital 
Acquisition 
Revolving 
Fund, 
Minneapolis, 
MN 
Land 
acquisition 
financing for 
cmcl, mixed-
income, rental 
and multifamily 
homeownership 
properties in 
commercial and 
transit corridors 
In 2006; 
created by the 
Minneapolis 
City Council 
Revolving Loan 
Fund; $1 
million 
City 
Community 
Planning and 
Econ Dev. 
Dept 
Top Loss: City 
of Minneapolis 
At least 20% of housing 
units at <50% Metro 
Median Income (MMI) 
N/A N/A N/A 
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Fund & 
Location Goal 
Initiation 
Date & 
Origin of 
Fund 
Fund Type & 
Size 
Fund 
Manager 
Capital 
Stack/ First 
Loss Position 
Affordability or 
Other Key Project 
Requirements 
Terms 
Number 
of Loans 
Made 
Lessons/ 
Complexities 
Hiawatha 
LRT Land 
Assembly, 
Minneapolis, 
MN 
Financing for 
mixed-use, 
pedestrian and 
TOD projects 
located near 
Hiawatha LRT 
transit stations. 
In 2005, the 
City of 
Minneapolis 
issued an RFP 
requesting for 
land 
acquisition 
proposals 
Grant Fund; $5 
million 
Minneapolis 
Metropolitan 
Council 
N/A Either: 20% of units 
must be affordable 
(<50% MMI). legal 
commitment to build 
affordable units 
elsewhere in the City, 
or $80,000 per un-built 
affordable unit. 15-year 
affordability restriction. 
One time grant 3 grants N/A 
Land 
Acquisition 
for 
Affordable 
New 
Development, 
Minneapolis, 
MN 
Land 
acquisition 
financing for 
affordable 
housing 
projects. 
In 2007, 
established by 
the 
Metropolitan 
Council 
Revolving Loan 
Fund; $4 
million 
Minneapolis 
Metropolitan 
Council 
Minnesota 
Housing, the 
Metropolitan 
Council, Family 
Housing Fund 
20% of units at 60% 
AMI in the Metro area 
and 80% of AMI in 
Greater Minnesota; 7-
year affordability 
restriction for 
homeownership 
projects. 
Construction 
between Year 1 to 
Year 5; Repayment 
based on appraised 
value of the site at 
the time of 
repayment 
N/A N/A 
Eastern States 
New York 
City 
Acquisition 
Fund, New 
York, NY 
Pre-
development 
and land 
acquisition 
financing for 
affordable 
housing in five 
boroughs of 
NYC. 
In March 
2006; created 
by the 
Corporation 
for Supportive 
Housing, 
Enterprise, 
LISC, NYC 
HDC, and 
LIIF. 
Early stage 
capital for 
loans; $243.1 
million 
Forsyth Street 
Advisors 
Risk Waterfall: 
Borrower 
Equity (5%), 
Recourse to the 
Borrower 
(25%), 
Originating 
Lender (2%), 
Fund Balance 
($8 mil Public 
and $32 mil PRI 
funds), Senior 
lenders (Bottom 
50%) 
All loans must meet the 
Fund’s charitable 
purpose requirements. 
Max. Loan Term: 3 
years; Max. loan 
amount: $400,000- 
750,000; Interest 
rate: Variable; LTV: 
130% ( Non-profit 
Borrower) or up to 
95% (For-profit) 
23 projects 
funded 
As loans are 
Credit-enhanced, 
Underwriting was 
crucial for senior 
lenders to be 
comfortable with 
loan approval 
process and credit 
enhancement. 
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Fund & 
Location Goal 
Initiation 
Date & 
Origin of 
Fund 
Fund Type & 
Size 
Fund 
Manager 
Capital 
Stack/ First 
Loss Position 
Affordability or 
Other Key Project 
Requirements 
Terms 
Number 
of Loans 
Made 
Lessons/ 
Complexities 
Atlanta 
Acquisition 
Pool, Atlanta, 
GA 
Property 
Acquisition 
financing for 
affordable and 
mixed-income 
housing 
In 2008; 
announced by 
the City of 
Atlanta, 
ACoRA, and 
Enterprise 
Community 
Partners 
Loan fund; 
$25.5 million 
Enterprise 
Community 
Loan Fund 
Borrower 
minimum 4% 
equity 
Units in mixed-income 
<60% AMI ; Units in 
rental: 20% affordable 
if funded by the city 
and >30% if funded by 
ACoRA; 
Homeownership units: 
30% to households up 
to 115% AMI and 
>50% units <80% AMI 
with ACoRA funding 
Max. loan term: 2 
years; Max. loan 
amount: $3  million; 
Interest rate: 6- 7%; 
Repayment: 
construction/equity 
financing; 2% 
commitment fee; 
LTV: <120% of 
collateral 
At the end 
of 2008, 
Two 
projects 
Were 
approved 
totaling 
$1.6 
million. 
N/A 
Washington 
D.C. 
Preservation 
Loan Fund, 
Washington 
D.C. 
Provide 
acquisition and 
pre-
development 
financing for 
existing 
multifamily 
affordable and 
mixed-income 
properties 
N/A Loan fund; $28 
million 
Enterprise 
Community 
Loan Fund 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Source:  Reconnecting America’s Center for Transit-Oriented Development.  San Francisco Bay Area Property Acquisition Fund for Equitable Transit-Oriented 
Development – Feasibility Assessment Report.  Oakland, CA. January 2010.  Pg. 23. 
 
 
 
